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Ownership-related Wage Differentials, Worker Education,  
and Worker Occupation in Vietnam’s Manufacturing Firms1 
 
Introduction and Summary 
This report is the second from a multi-year project examining how multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) affect wages and human resource development in Asia’s large developing 
economies. This report focuses on Vietnamese enterprises (firms), utilizing detailed 
information on the paid employment and wages by occupation, and on the educational 
background of workers to compare wages in two groups of MNEs, wholly foreign firms 
(WFs) and joint ventures (JVs).2 State-owned enterprises (SOEs) also play prominent roles in 
some Vietnamese industries. Correspondingly, the papers focus on evaluating the scope of 
WF-private, JV-private, and SOE-private wage differentials, and on comparing how these 
differentials vary among industries and worker occupations.  
Chapter 1 examines wage differentials among medium-large (20 or more employees) WFs, 
JVs, SOEs, and domestic private firms in Vietnamese manufacturing. The analysis focuses on 
2009 because it is possible to examine wage differentials after accounting for the influences 
of two measures of worker quality, educational background and occupation. Simple 
comparisons in large samples of 11 industries combined indicate that averages wages in JVs 
were about 92 percent higher than in private firms in 2009, SOEs and WFs paid 57 and 54 
percent more than private firms, respectively. Corresponding, conditional differentials that 
                                                 
1 This paper is one output of the research project “Multinationals, Wages, and Human Resources in Asia’s Large 
Developing Economies”, which was funded by the Asian Growth Research Institute (formerly the International 
Centre for the Study of East Asian Development) in fiscal 2014 (ending March 2015). We thank AGI and the 
University of Danang, School of Economics for financial and logistic assistance. Valuable comments were also 
received at an AGI Seminar on 25 February 2015. Responsibility for all opinions expressed and any remaining 
errors or omissions are the authors’ alone. 
2 I understand educational information is also available for Vietnamese firms in some recent years and the Thai 
census of manufacturing plants contains some information on skills of production workers. I am presently 
working with collaborators to perform similar analysis of these countries. I had also hoped to do similar analysis 
of Chinese firms, but there is little information on worker quality in the available data. 
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control for the influences of worker education and occupation, as well as capital intensity, size, 
and shares of female workers, were substantially smaller, but positive and significant in large 
samples. Wage levels and differentials varied substantially among industries. Conditional 
differentials were positive and significant for WFs and JFs in most of the 11 industries 
examined, but estimates of SOE-private differentials were insignificant in most industries. 
Robustness checks using 2007 data could not account for worker occupation, but revealed 
results similar to those for 2009. 
Chapter 2 examines wage differentials for four types of workers employed by medium-
large WFs, JVs, SOEs, and domestic private firms in Vietnamese manufacturing in 2009. 
When all sample firms were combined, unconditional JV-private and WF-private wage 
differentials were 106-124 percent for managers, 78-87 percent for professionals and 
technicians, 56-68 percent for clerical and support workers, and 22-48 percent for production 
workers. Corresponding, conditional wage differentials which account for the influences of 
worker education and sex, in addition to firm capital intensity and size, were positive and 
usually significant, but smaller, 72-78 percent for managers, 32-36 percent for professionals 
and technicians, 23-28 percent for clerical and support workers and 15-16 percent for 
production workers. SOE-private differentials were all much smaller. When estimated at the 
industry-level, conditional WF-private differentials were positive and significant for most 
occupations and industries. JV-private differentials were also positive and significant in most 
industries for highly paid managers or professionals and technicians, but not for lowly paid 
clerical and support workers or production workers. Most SOE-private differentials were also 
insignificant when estimated at the industry level. In short, there was a strong tendency for 
MNE-private differentials to be larger for managers than for professionals and technicians, 
and a somewhat weaker tendency for differentials to be larger for professionals and 
technicians than for clerical and support workers. 
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Chapter 1 
Wage Differentials among Ownership Groups and Worker Quality in 
Vietnamese Manufacturing  
 
 
  Kien Trung Nguyen, The University of Danang, School of Economics 
and 
Eric D. Ramstetter, Asian Growth Research Institute and Kyushu University 
 
 
1.1.  Introduction  
There is a growing literature indicating that foreign-owned multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) normally pay higher wages than domestic firms in host, developing economies. The 
most sophisticated studies to date have analysed manufacturing plants in Indonesia and 
Malaysia, and accounted for the fact that multinational enterprises tend to hire relatively well-
educated workers and be relatively large and capital or input intensive compared to local 
plants (Lipsey and Sjöholm 2004; Ramstetter 2014; Ramstetter and Narjoko 2013).  These 
studies often found positive and significant wage differentials between foreign MNEs and 
local plants, even after controlling the influences of worker education and sex, as well as plant 
size and capital intensity. However, aside from limited evidence in Ramstetter and Phan 
(2007), Tran (2007), and Fukase (2014a, 2014b), there is very little evidence regarding wage 
differentials among firm ownership groups in Vietnam, which accounts for the influence of 
worker quality. This paper partially fills the gap in the literature by using data on worker 
quality that were unavailable in previous years to analyse determinants of wages in 
manufacturing firms in Vietnam’s in 2007 and 2009,.  
The relatively large role played by MNEs in Vietnam and Vietnam’s intensified emphasis 
on outward-oriented economic liberalization since the early 2000s  has generated interest how 
MNEs affect the local economy and local workers. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) have 
traditionally been designated to control key capital-intensive industries. However, the 
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promulgation of the Enterprise Law in 2000, the negotiation of the Bilateral Trade Agreement 
with the United States in 2001, the implementation of many commitments made under the 
ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Free Trade Area (AFTA) by 2005 or 
shortly thereafter, and the implementation of further revisions to the Enterprise Law and 
related Investment Laws that eventually led to WTO (World Trade Organization) accession in 
2006 were all substantive policy changes that reduced ownership-related policy biases in 
Vietnamese manufacturing. Correspondingly, the economic environment during 2007-09, was 
substantially more open and competitive than even five years previous, and many firms were 
still in the process of adjusting to the large policy changes. During this period, firms were also 
affected by the world financial crisis, which was partially responsible for the decline of 
Vietnam’s economic growth rate to 5.4-6.4 percent in 2008-13 from the 6.8-7.8 percent that 
were experienced in 2000-07  (Asian Development Bank 2014).  
In this paper, we first review the literature on MNE-local wage differentials (Section 2) and 
describe the enterprise data that are used for the analysis, focusing on unconditional 
differentials in wages and worker skills between MNEs and private firms (Section 3). Then 
we test if wage differentials are statistically significant after accounting for firm size, capital 
intensity, worker sex, and worker education in both 2007and 2009 (Section 4). For 2009, it is 
also possible to control for the influence of worker occupation. The focus is on analysis of 
2009 data because they allow better control for worker quality, but the estimates for 2007 
provide an important robustness check. Finally, Section 5 offers some conclusions and 
suggestions for future research. 
 
1.2.  Literature Review and Methodology 
There is a compelling theoretical rationale suggesting that MNEs will often pay higher 
wages than corresponding domestic enterprises in host developing economies. On the demand 
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side, MNEs are often argued to possess large amounts of knowledge-based, generally 
intangible assets such as production technology, marketing networks and management 
systems. Possession of these firm-specific assets suggests that MNEs will be likely to be more 
efficient than non-MNEs, which is reflected by larger firm size, higher factor productivity, 
and/or correspondingly higher factor rewards.  
Many MNEs also require their employees, even relatively unskilled staff, to have 
engineering, marketing, and foreign language skills required to work with particular 
machinery and clients. In addition, many of these employees need to learn modern work 
disciplines, such as punctuality, tidiness and promptness, which may not be valued as highly 
in local firms, for example. Firms operating in developing economies like Vietnam often face 
shortages of skilled workers who have both engineering, foreign language, and modern 
management skills. Thus, MNEs relative unfamiliarity with local labor markets may make it 
more difficult for them to hire new skilled workers, or retain current skilled workers than 
domestic firms. This may motivate MNEs to pay relatively high wages as an incentive to 
increase the attractiveness of their firms to skilled workers or to reduce turnover.  
On the supply side, workers may prefer to work for locally owned firms because they are 
more familiar with local management practices. In Vietnam, for example, it is clear that labor 
market practices often vary greatly between MNEs and local firms. Nonetheless, our 
impression is that most Vietnamese workers are not very opposed to working for MNEs and 
many might actually prefer MNE employment to the alternatives. This is supported by studies 
which suggest that internal migrants in Vietnam often prefer to work for MNEs over local 
firms (Fukase 2014b). 
Some of the most comprehensive analyses of wage differentials to date have examined 
Indonesian manufacturing plants in 1996 and 2006 (Lipsey and Sjöholm 2004; Ramstetter and 
Narjoko 2013). For 1996, estimates of Mincer-type wage equations at the plant level found 
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strong evidence that MNEs paid higher wages than domestic firms after controlling for size, 
input intensity, the share of female workers, and worker education. For 2006, estimates in 
large samples of all manufacturing plants combined and a few individual industries also 
reveal positive and significant wage differentials, but many of the industry-level regressions 
indicate that conditional wage differentials were not significant in the latter year.1 In addition, 
analyses of Malaysian plants in 2000-2004 also suggest that conditional wage differentials 
accounting for both worker education and occupation were positive and significant in most of 
the individual industries examined and when all sample industries were combined (Ramstetter 
2014). Although they do not control for the effects of worker education or occupation, other 
studies of  Malaysia (Lim 1977) and  Thailand (Matsuoka-Movshuk and Movshuk 2006; 
Ramstetter 2004) also found positive and significant wage differentials after controlling for 
plant-level differences in capital intensity and size, for example.   
Similar studies of Vietnam are sparse. Most of previous studies of wage differentials 
primarily focused on gender wage gaps, finding that women tend to earn significantly less 
than men (Liu 2001, 2004; McCarty 1999; Pham and Reilly 2007). Similar to this study, 
Ramstetter and Phan (2007) and Tran (2007), examined conditional wage differentials 
between MNEs and local firms in Vietnamese manufacturing during 2000-2005. Both studies 
found positive and significant wage differentials, but their measures worker quality (the 
shares of science and technical workers) were not as comprehensive as in the Indonesian or 
Malaysian data. More recently, the 2007 and 2009 enterprise surveys included more detailed 
questions on worker education, and the 2009 survey also has information on worker 
occupation. This study thus focuses on analyzing these years. A recent study by Fukase 
(2014a) used household data to compare the wages paid to workers in MNEs and domestic 
                                                 
1 In the combined sample of all manufacturing plants, intercept dummies are used to capture industry-
specific effects. The industry-level regressions are more general in that they allow intercepts and all slope 
coefficients to differ among industries 
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firms, also finding that MNEs and SOEs tended to pay higher wages than private firms and 
another study (Fukase 2014b) found that internal migrants were attracted by job opportunities 
in MNEs and SOEs.  
In Vietnam, ownership-related wage differentials are also related to government 
regulations, which require MNEs to pay higher minimum wages than private companies 
(Nguyen 2014). For example, in 2006-2007 minimum wages in WFs and JVs were 58-93 
percent higher than in domestic firms (private firms and SOEs combined), depending on the 
region. In 2009, these differentials declined to 38-50 percent. Foreign-domestic differentials 
in minimum wages were largest in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City and smallest in rural areas. 
On the other hand, it is important to note that minimum wage requirements only affect base 
salaries, and domestic firms often pay much higher bonuses than multinationals. 2  As 
explained by Ramstetter and Phan (2007), SOEs were also required to pay relatively high 
minimum wages in previous years, though we have no new information on this point. 
 
1.3. The Data, Wage Differentials and Worker Quality 
This study analyzes medium-large firms (20 or more employees) included in Vietnam’s 
Annual Enterprise Surveys for 2007 and 2009 (General Statistical Office 2011, 2013). To date, 
only these two surveys have collected comprehensive information on employee education and 
wages. The 2009 data also have information on worker occupation but this indicator is not 
available for the 2007. All values are expressed in 2000 prices using appropriate deflators.3 
Wages are defined to include regular salaries and other compensation such as bonuses, 
                                                 
2 See Appendix Table See Asian Development Bank Institute newsletter of 23 October 2013; received by 
email on that date. 
3 Output is converted using a manufacturing output deflator at the two-digit level of Vietnam’s Standard 
Industrial Classification. Capital is converted using the deflator is for fixed-capital formation from the 
national accounts (General Statistics Office various years a, various years b). 
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subsidies, social security, health insurance, and pension insurance. Real wages are calculated 
using the consumer price index (CPI). 
Most MNEs, including both WFs and JVs, and SOEs are medium- or large-sized firms, 
which differ in many respects from smaller firms, which are predominantly private. Therefore, 
it is more meaningful to compare wages among medium-large manufacturing firms with a 
workforce of at least 20 employees. In addition to making the comparison more consistent and 
meaningful, excluding small firms also allows us to remove most outliers and most firms 
reporting implausible data.4 The analysis also excludes five industries with very few MNEs 
and/or SOEs (tobacco; publishing and printing; petroleum and gas; miscellaneous 
manufacturing; and recycling). 
After eliminating firms that were small, had implausible data, or were in one of the five 
excluded industries, 10,221 sample firms remained in 2007 and 10,698 in 2009. These sample 
firms employed 2.79 million paid workers in 2007 and 3.12 million in 2009 (Table 1). These 
totals were 74 and 76 percent, respectively, of total employment reported for manufacturing 
firms in enterprise survey publications (General Statistics Office (2011, 2013) but only 48-49 
percent of all manufacturing employees reported by the labor force surveys. In other words, 
although firms excluded from the samples were relatively small employers, there were a large 
number of manufacturing workers in units not surveyed by the enterprise surveys. Most were 
probably employed by household firms, which are excluded from the enterprise surveys.  
As mentioned above, the Enterprise Law was promulgated in 2000 and revised as part of 
the WTO accession process in 2005-2006, along with SOE and foreign investment laws. Thus, 
by 2007-2009, there was a consistent legal framework and common investment climate for all 
types of firms. However, Vietnam’s foreign investment law has been relatively open since it’s 
                                                 
4 In addition, only limited information is collected from very small local firms with 10 or fewer employees 
(Jammal et al., 2006). 
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promulgation in 1987 and Vietnam’s policy implementation still favors both MNEs and SOEs 
over private firms in many cases. Partially as a result of this legacy, MNEs and SOEs 
accounted for relatively large shares of paid employment in manufacturing firms (Table 1).  
However, reflecting efforts to privatize and equitize many SOEs, SOE shares declined 
markedly after 2000, while MNE shares increased. Table 1 indicates these trends continued in 
2007-09, with SOE shares of paid workers in the 11 sample industries declining from 13 to 10 
percent while the total MNE (JV+WF) share rose from 43 to 47 percent. WFs accounted for 
the vast majority of MNE employment, their share rising from 37 to 42 percent while the JV 
share fell slightly from 5.3 to 4.6 percent. WFs are concentrated in labor-intensive industries 
such as wood and furniture, apparel, leather, and footwear; and electronics. WF employment 
shares also exceeded one quarter in three relatively capital-intensive industries: transportation 
machinery, textiles, and basic metals and metal products.  
Of the 11 sample industries, paid employment was largest in apparel leather, and footwear, 
with 1.08 million paid workers in 2007 and 1.21 million in 2009, followed by food and 
beverages with 0.35 and 0.40 million, respectively, and wood and furniture, with 0.30 and 
0.31 million, respectively. 54 and 60 percent, respectively of the paid workers in the apparel 
group worked in WFs WFs were also large in the smaller electronic machinery industry, 
accounting for 72 and 80 percent, respectively, and the paid workers in this industry. These 
two industries accounted for two-thirds of the paid workers in WFs. At the other end of the 
scale, WF shares were relatively small in food and beverages (13 percent) and non-metallic 
mineral products (6.1-6.4 percent). JV shares were almost one-fifth in transportation 
machinery, but much smaller (6.4 percent or less) in the 10 other sample industries. In 2007, 
SOE shares were one fifth or more in textiles, chemicals, rubber, and plastics, non-metallic 
mineral products, and transportation machinery, but in 2009 this was only true in 
transportation machinery.  
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Table 2 presents unconditional wage differentials between WFs, JVs, and SOEs on the one 
hand, and domestic private firms on the other, for 2007 and 2009.  On average, JVs paid the 
highest wages; the mean JV-private wage differential was 175 percent in 2007 and 92 percent 
in 2009 when firms in all 11 industries were combined. For WFs and SOEs, mean 
differentials were 68 and 72 percent, respectively, in 2007, and 54 and 57 percent, 
respectively, in 2009. In other words, on average, JVs paid the highest mean wages in the 11 
sample industries, followed distantly by SOEs, and WFs, but all groups paid substantially 
higher wages than private firms. JVs also paid the highest wages in all 11 industries in 2007 
and in eight industries in 2009. In 2009, WFs paid the highest wages in the apparel group and 
WFs and SOEs both paid the most in paper and general machinery. Although WF-private 
differentials in were the smallest in samples of all 11 industries combined, WF-private 
differentials were the smallest in five industries in 2007 and three in 2009. On the other hand, 
SOE-private differentials were the smallest in six industries in both 2007 and 2009.  
Previous, plant-level evidence for Indonesia (Ramstetter and Narjoko 2013, Table 2) 
suggests a similar tendency for MNEs with large ownership shares (90 percent or larger) to 
have relatively small unconditional wage differentials compared to other MNEs. MNE-related 
wage differentials in Table 1 are also of similar as those for Indonesian production workers in 
2006, though they are considerably smaller than differentials for 1996 and for non-production 
workers in 2006. This pattern makes sense because most of the paid workers in the 
Vietnamese samples are production workers or non-production workers in relatively low-
wage occupations.  
The size of MNE-local wage differentials may also be related to the size of the technology 
gap between MNEs and private plants, which is likely to be smaller at higher levels of wages 
and incomes. There is also a similar, though less consistent tendency for WFs or MNEs with 
relatively large ownership shares to have relatively small labor productivity differentials 
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relative to local plants among ownership groups in Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam 
(Ramstetter 2004; Ramstetter and Phan 2013; Takii 2004; Takii and Ramstetter 2005). 
Another factor leading to wage differentials is the previously noted tendency Vietnam’s 
minimum, base wages to be highest in MNEs, though this difference is often offset by higher 
payments of other compensation in domestic firms and minimum wage requirements are 
probably not binding for many MNEs. 
When the 11 sample industries are combined, shares of paid workers who completed 
tertiary education were also higher in SOEs and JVs than in WFs and private firms in both 
years (Table 3). In JVs this share increased from 16 percent in 2007 to 17 percent in 2009, in 
SOEs the share increased from 13 to 17 percent, respectively. Corresponding shares in WFs 
and private firms also increased but were much smaller (5.9-7.3 percent). Although it is 
reasonable to expect tertiary shares to rise during this period, the large increase for SOEs 
suggests substantial differences in the SOE sample between the two years, perhaps reflecting 
the influence of privatization.  
There is also large variation in tertiary shares among industries (Table 3). For example, all 
ownership groups had relatively high tertiary shares in the chemicals group and electronic 
machinery, but relatively low shares in the apparel group. On the other hand, WFs and SOEs 
had relatively high tertiary shares in food and beverages, as did JVs in 2009, but tertiary 
shares were relatively low in private firms in both years. At the industry level, there are a 
number of other large changes in tertiary shares between 2007 and 2009 which suggest 
substantial differences in underlying sample firms in some industry-owner combinations.5 
                                                 
5 For example, tertiary shares increased or decreased by more than 6 percentage points for SOEs and JVs in 
the metals group, general machinery, and electronic machinery, JVs only in wood and furniture, and SOEs 
only in transportation machinery. Although these large changes are not impossible and there were large 
economic changes in 2007-09, variables like shares of workers by educational background don’t usually 
change much in a short period of time.  
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Mean shares of moderately educated workers (those who completed secondary education 
(e.g., high school or vocational training college, but not tertiary education) in all sample firms 
were larger than corresponding tertiary shares all ownership groups in 2007 and for private 
firms and WFs, but not for SOEs or JVs in 2009 (Tables 3, 4). Moreover, differences between 
secondary shares and tertiary shares tended to be relatively small, six percentage points or less 
in absolute value. This pattern contrasts sharply with Indonesia in 2006, for example, where 
secondary shares tended to be substantially larger (e.g., 10-20 percentage points or even 
more) than tertiary shares. The contrast partially reflects the relatively heavy emphasis 
Vietnam has placed on higher education at relatively low levels of per capita income.  
In addition to data on worker education, the 2009 survey also provides data on four types of 
worker occupations, two of which are highly paid, managerial employees, and professional, 
technical and supervisory employees. To further account for worker quality in this year, 
shares of these highly paid workers are also calculated (Table 5). In all 11 sample industries 
combined, SOEs and JVs also had the highest shares of high quality workers by this measure 
24 and 22 percent, respectively, but in WFs and private firms, these shares were only 16 
percent. Similar to tertiary shares, shares of highly paid workers were relatively large for all 
groups in the chemicals group and electronic machinery, in addition to the metals group, 
general machinery, and transportation machinery..  
 
1.4. Econometric Estimates of Conditional Wage Differentials 
As emphasized in the literature, ownership-related wage differentials in the manufacturing 
sector are likely to be related to workforce characteristics such as education attainment and 
occupation. The literature also suggests that firm characteristics such as size, capital intensity, 
and the share of females in paid employees may also influence the extent of wage differentials. 
Therefore, in this section we continue with an econometric analysis to examine the extent to 
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which ownership-related wage differentials persist after controlling for the influences of 
worker education, occupation, and sex, as well as firm capital intensity and size. Similar to 
previous studies, we estimate the following model:  
ln൫ܴ ௜ܹ௝൯ ൌ ܽ଴ ൅ ܽଵ ln൫ܭܫ௜௝൯ ൅ ܽଶ ln൫ܴ ௜ܱ௝൯ ൅ ܽଷܵܪ௜௝ ൅ ܽସܵܯ௜௝ ൅ ܽହܵ ௜ܲ௝ 
൅ܽ଺ܵܨ௜௝ ൅ ܽ଻ܦ ௜ܹ௝ ൅ ଼ܽܦܬ௜௝ ൅	ܽଽܦ ௜ܵ௝ ൅ ߝ௜௝            (1) 
 
where 
RWij= Average real wage of firm i of industry j. 
ROij= Real output of firm i of industry j. 
KIij= Capital intensity of firm i of industry j, measured as the ratio of fixed capital 
stock over employment after deflating capital stock at a constant value. 
SHij= A share of highly educated employees in total employment of firm i of 
industry j (per cent).  
SMij= A share of moderately educated employees in total employment of firm i of 
industry j (per cent). 
SPij= A share of employees in highly paid occupation in total employment of firm 
i of industry j (per cent). 
SFij= A share of female employees in total employment of firm i of industry j (per 
cent). 
DWij= A dummy for wholly-owned, foreign-invested enterprises (wholly foreign 
firms – WF), taking a value of one if a firm is wholly owned FIE and zero 
otherwise. 
DJij= A dummy for joint venture enterprises (JV), taking a value of one if a firm is 
FIE joint venture and zero otherwise. 
DSij= A dummy for state-owned enterprises (SOE), taking a value of one if a firm 
is state-owned and zero otherwise. 
ߝ௜௝= A stochastic error term. 
 
All estimates also include vectors of dummy variables identifying seven regions and as many 
as 28 industries, usually defined at the two- or  three-digit level of Vietnam’s Standard 
Industrial Classification (VSIC) to account for region-specific and industry-specific 
influences on the constant which are not captured by the firm-level variables.6 Industry-
                                                 
6 The regions are Hanoi, the Red River Delta, the North Mountainous Area, the Central Coast and Central 
Highland Area, the South East Area, Ho Chi Minh City, and the Mekong Delta (used as the base dummy). 
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specific effects on constants and slopes are also accounted for in more detail by estimating 
equations for each of the 11 sample industries separately, as well as all 11 industries 
combined.  
  Coefficients on capital intensity (a1) and real output (a2) are expected to be positive because 
capital-intensive and large firms generally pay higher wages than labor-intensive or small 
firms. Coefficients on the shares of highly or moderately educated workers (a3, a4) and shares 
of highly paid workers occupations (a5) should also be positive because they suggest higher 
worker quality in firms with relatively high shares. In contrast, the coefficient on the share of 
female workers (a6) is likely to be negative because firms with a higher proportion of female 
workers tend to have lower average wages.7 Finally, if wage differentials between WFs JVs, 
and SOEs, on the one hand, and private firms, on the other, persist after controlling for worker 
education, occupation, and sex, as well as firm size and capital intensity, the signs of the 
coefficients on DW, DJ, and DS (a7, a8, a9) will be positive.  
Because data on worker occupation are only available for 2009, we focus on estimates for 
this year, but also provide estimates for 2007 without this variable as a robustness check. 
Estimates are performed in cross sections, which mean that the coefficients on DW, DJ, and 
DS (a7, a8, a9) can be interpreted as conditional wage differentials similar to the unconditional 
differentials in Table 2. However, it is also possible that wages could influence firm’s capital 
intensity and size, creating potential simultaneity between the dependent and independent 
variables. To check for the robustness of the results to simultaneity concerns, estimates of 
both contemporaneous and lagged specifications, where capital intensity and output are 
lagged one year, are compared. All estimates use robust standard errors to account for 
                                                                                                                                                        
Industries are defined at the 3-digit level for industries having at least 2 firms of each ownership type in 
them; 3-digit categories are combined or 2-digit categories used in industries with fewer firms.   
7 Females tend to earn less than males because they tend to be less educated and have less experience in 
high paying jobs, and because they are discriminated against in the workplace and when educational 
resources are allocated.  
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heteroskedasiticity that can be expected when firm-level, scale variables (e.g., output, capital 
intensity) are used.  
In large samples of firms in all 11 industries combined, estimated coefficients were always 
consistent with expectations for 2007 and generally consistent for 2009 (Table 6). In both 
years, coefficients on firm size, shares of highly educated workers, and female shares had the 
expected sign and were highly significant at the 1 percent level or better. Similarly, 
coefficients on capital intensity and the share of moderately educated workers were positive 
and highly significant for 2007.  For 2009, the coefficient on the share of highly paid workers 
was also positive and highly significant, and the coefficient on the share of moderately 
educated workers was also significant at the standard 5 percent level. However, the coefficient 
on capital intensity was insignificant in 2009. Nonetheless, the goodness of fit measure (R2) 
was about 0.48 for 2009 estimates and 0.42 for 2007, suggesting that the model explained the 
variation in the dependent variable rather well, given the cross sectional context. Moreover, 
the differences between the size of most coefficients, notable the coefficients on the 
ownership dummies, were similar in the contemporaneous and lagged specifications, 
suggesting that any simultaneity bias is likely to be small. 
Most importantly, the estimates suggest that MNEs and SOEs paid significantly higher 
wages than local firms, even after controlling for the influences of capital intensity, firm size 
as well as worker education, sex, and occupation. However, conditional wage differentials 
were all substantially smaller than corresponding unconditional differentials in Table 2. For 
example, conditional WF-private wage differentials were about 28-29 percent in 2009 and 23-
25 percent in 2007, JV-private differentials were 28-30 percent and 29-31 percent, 
respectively, and SOE-private differentials were 9-10 percent and 13-15 percent, respectively, 
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and that all of these wage differentials were highly significant statistically.8 These results are 
consistent with the patterns observed in Table 2 because they imply JVs pay the highest 
wages, followed by WFs, SOEs and lastly private firms. On the other hand, the conditional 
differentials were much closer in magnitude than unconditional differentials for WFs and JVs; 
in other words, the controls in equation (1) apparently explain a much larger portion of JV-
private wage differentials than of WF-private differentials. Nonetheless, Wald tests suggest it 
is statistically meaningful to distinguish JVs and WFs when estimating equation (1).  
Given substantial differences in the cross sections used, the lack of worker occupation data 
for 2007, and that fact that the capital intensity variable was insignificant for 2009, it is 
difficult to compare differentials between 2007 and 2009 meaningfully. Comparisons between 
the two years are further confounded by large differences in the macroeconomic environment 
in these two years. For example, the growth rate of real manufacturing GDP plummeted from 
over 12.4 percent in 2007 to 9.8 percent in 2008 and only 2.8 percent in 2009, while the 
growth of the manufacturing deflator skyrocketed from 4.5 percent in 2007 to 13.2 percent in 
2008 and 7.3 percent in 2009.9 On the other hand, the finding of significant, ownership-
related wage differentials in both years suggests they were an important feature of Vietnamese 
manufacturing which were robust to substantial macroeconomic change. 
Estimates of equation (1) also performed relatively well when estimates separately in the 11 
sample industries. For example, the goodness of fit measure always exceeded 0.4 in six of the 
11 industries and was below 0.3 in only one industry (the apparel group) in 2007. Coefficients 
on real output, the share of highly educated workers were positive and significant at standard 
levels in almost all estimates. Coefficients on the share of female workers were negative and 
significant in 19 of the 22 estimates for 2009, but only 14 for 2007. The coefficient on the 
                                                 
8 Because dependent and independent variables are in natural logs, conditional differentials are calculated 
as the exponential value of the relevant coefficients (a7, a8, a9) from estimates of equation (1). 
9 Data downloaded from www.gso.gov.vn on 22 January 2014. 
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share of highly paid workers was also significant in 14 of the 22 cases for 2009. On the other 
hand, coefficients on capital intensity and the share of moderately educated workers were 
almost never significant at the industry level. 
As with unconditional wage differentials, conditional wage differentials between WFs, JVs, 
and SOEs, on the one hand, and domestic private firms on the other, varied greatly among 
industries (Table 7). 10  WF-private differentials were positive and significant in all 11 
industries in 2009 and 10 of 11 industries (all except non-metallic mineral products) in 2007. 
WF-private differentials tended to be largest in general machinery (55-59 percent in 2009 and 
40-42 percent in 2007), the metals group (34 and 31-32 percent, respectively), transportation 
machinery (32-35 and 62-65 percent, respectively), the chemicals group (35 and 36-38 
percent, respectively), and textiles (38-40 and 28-29 percent, respectively). On the other hand, 
WF-private differentials were consistently small in the apparel group (21 and 10-11 percent, 
respectively).  
Conditional, JV-private wage differentials were also positive in 10 of the 11 industry 
groups (all except paper) in 2009 (Table 7). However, in 2007 differentials were insignificant 
at standard levels in four industries: the apparel group, wood and furniture, paper, and general 
machinery. The JV-private differential was also rather small in the apparel group in 2009, 
though it was positive and highly significant. JV-private differentials were significant and 
tended to be largest in both years in the chemicals group, electronic machinery, and the metals 
group in both years. Estimated differentials were also relatively large in textiles in 2009, but 
smaller in 2007, while the reverse was true in transportation machinery. Wald tests again 
indicate that it is usually meaningful to distinguish JVs and WFs when estimates of equation 
(1) are performed at the industry level. 
                                                 
10 See Appendix Table 1 for all slope coefficients and equation information provided for the 11 industry 
sample in Table 6. To conserve space, Table 7 only provides wage differential coefficients and results of 
testing the null hypothesis that JV-private and WF-private differentials were equal. 
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Although most WF-private and JV-private differentials were significant when estimated at 
the industry level, most SOE-private wage differentials were insignificant. There were three 
notable exceptions: food and beverages, the chemicals group, and electronic machinery. There 
was also some indication of positive and significant SOE-private differentials in 
transportation machinery in 2007 and in the apparel group in 2009 (lagged specification only). 
In other words, most of the unconditional, SOE-private differentials are apparently explained 
by differences in worker education, occupation, and sex, as well as firm-level capital intensity 
and size.  
 
1.5. Conclusions and Future Research 
This paper has examined the extent of wage differentials among medium-large MNEs, 
SOEs, and domestic private firms in Vietnamese manufacturing in 2007 and 2009, following 
the numerous policy reforms that removed ownership-related biases and lowered protection 
from imports. When all sample firms were combined, simple comparisons suggest that 
average wages were 92-175 percent higher in joint venture MNEs than in private firms, while 
average wages in SOEs and wholly foreign MNEs were 54-72 percent higher than in private 
firms. Wage levels and unconditional wage differentials between JVs, WFs, and SOEs on the 
one hand, and private firms on the other, varied substantially among the 11 sample industries 
studied.  
Conditional wage differentials which account the influences of worker education, 
occupation, and sex, in addition to firm capital intensity and size on wage determination at the 
firm level were positive and significant for WFs, JVs, and SOEs when estimated in large 
samples of including all 11 industries. However, conditional wage differentials were much 
smaller than corresponding, unconditional differentials, 28-31 percent for JVs, 23-29 percent 
for WFs, and 9-16 percent for SOEs. Moreover, when conditional differentials were estimated 
17 
 
at the industry level, they were insignificant for SOEs in most industries. On the other hand, 
conditional differentials were significant in 10 of 11 industries for WFs in both years and for 
JVs in 2009, and in seven industries in 2007. The consistency of these results is important 
because 2007 and 2009 were two very different years and suggests findings of positive and 
significant JV-private and WF-private wage differentials is rather robust. 
Because the industry-level results indicate substantial differences in slope coefficients 
among industries, industry-level estimates of wage differentials are probably more accurate 
than results from large samples of all 11 industries combined. These results also suggest that 
industry-level differentials were more persuasive in Vietnam in 2007 and 2009 than MNE-
private differentials in Indonesia in 1996 and 2006 and MNE-local differentials in Malaysia in 
2000-2004. They are also consistent with results from studies of Vietnamese household data 
which suggest MNEs tend to pay relatively high wages and attract immigrants.  
In short, these results provide important support for previous studies indicating that MNEs 
often pay significantly higher wages than local firms or plants in Southeast Asia, even after 
accounting important aspects of worker quality and other firm- or plant-level characteristics 
affecting wage determination. These results suggest there are important benefits accruing to 
workers in MNEs and conversely provide important evidence that MNEs do not exploit their 
workers unfairly. On the other hand, they should not be construed as evidence that workers 
would be better off if the government were to promote MNEs at the expense of other 
ownership groups, because MNE-local wage differentials are related to firm characteristics 
that distinguish MNEs from non-MNEs. 
Although these results are important, further research in this area should seek to address a 
number of related issues. For example, how do changes in ownership affect wages and 
employment? Further investigation of this issue is particularly relevant in Vietnam because it 
can help illustrate the effects of privatizing SOEs. Another important question is how does 
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MNE presence affect wage levels in domestic firms or are there wage spillovers from MNE 
presence? Analysis of issues raised these questions requires the use of panel data, the creation 
of which is not straightforward in the Vietnamese case. 
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Industry All firms, number
SOE
 shares
WF
 shares
JV 
shares
All firms, 
number
SOE
 shares
WF
 shares
JV 
shares
11 sample industries 2,793,123 12.80 37.50 5.33 3,121,007 9.93 42.30 4.59
 Food & beverages 354,508 14.06 12.77 5.89 403,724 9.64 13.05 6.39
 Textiles 152,230 22.47 32.53 4.55 142,013 14.67 38.87 2.25
 Apparel, leather, & footwear 1,081,636 7.25 53.97 4.85 1,205,799 4.89 60.22 3.71
 Wood products & furniture 300,553 6.79 32.46 2.70 313,291 4.09 37.24 2.37
 Paper 57,452 15.73 19.99 0.81 62,779 12.73 24.16 0.68
 Chemicals, rubber, & plastics 186,057 20.81 29.99 4.96 212,183 15.47 36.62 3.40
 Non-metallic mineral products 197,056 22.65 6.17 5.50 215,953 19.11 6.41 4.41
 Basic metals & metal products 147,612 18.24 25.33 4.30 172,630 17.62 30.85 3.71
 General machinery 39,392 18.52 23.63 1.56 43,748 18.03 25.86 1.65
 Electronic machinery 155,360 7.48 71.74 6.31 193,414 5.09 79.65 4.78
 Transportation machinery 121,270 30.14 27.78 19.15 155,475 31.06 28.42 18.39
Excluded industries and firms 490,934 22.13 36.94 0.98 523,856 12.37 36.00 1.28
Table 1: Total paid employees in sample firms (number) and shares of SOEs, WFs, and JVs shares (% of industry 
subtotals)
Note: Samples include firms with 20 or more paid workers and positive sales, worker compensation, and fixed assets; 
excluded industries are tobacco, publishing and printing, petroleum products, miscellaneous manufacturing, and recycling. 
Source: Author's compilations from General Statistics Office (2011, 2013).
2007 2009
20
2007 2009
Industry Private firms
SOE-
private
WF-
private
JV-
private
Private 
firms
SOE-
private
WF-
private
JV-
private
11 sample industries 12.85 72 68 175 14.49 57 54 92
 Food & beverages 11.63 92 59 167 14.90 54 83 88
 Textiles 11.28 36 62 77 11.71 40 62 84
 Apparel, leather, & footwear 12.12 4 24 24 12.53 15 39 30
 Wood products & furniture 11.54 28 40 67 11.72 18 53 67
 Paper 12.55 58 46 131 14.42 61 61 -5
 Chemicals, rubber, & plastics 14.68 123 134 230 17.13 82 66 86
 Non-metallic mineral products 12.03 71 42 231 14.10 78 67 107
 Basic metals & metal products 14.66 54 62 155 16.53 36 45 92
 General machinery 16.31 33 -1 79 18.30 32 31 28
 Electronic machinery 16.09 88 176 188 20.11 50 11 117
 Transportation machinery 14.63 73 5 168 17.63 18 24 72
Table 2: Mean compensation per worker in private firms (million dong) and unconditional ownership-related 
wage differentials (percentage differentials) for paid workers in sample firms
Note: See Table 1 for a precise definition of sample firms; compensation refer to all payments to workers, 
including employer contributions to social insurance.
Source: Author's compilations from General Statistics Office (2011, 2013).
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Table 3: Shares of paid workers with tertiary education in sample firms (percent)
2007 2009
Industry Private SOEs WFs JVs Private SOEs WFs JVs
11 sample industries 5.93 12.57 6.80 15.55 6.71 17.49 7.30 16.90
 Food & beverages 5.71 11.73 14.40 6.50 6.60 14.25 14.87 18.49
 Textiles 4.34 9.29 3.68 2.01 4.19 10.15 3.61 7.43
 Apparel, leather, & footwear 3.22 3.32 2.08 7.98 3.51 5.87 2.33 2.64
 Wood products & furniture 3.63 10.93 2.52 17.19 3.95 12.30 3.22 8.54
 Paper 5.63 9.88 6.65 18.49 6.20 9.65 6.24 16.84
 Chemicals, rubber, & plastics 9.85 17.03 11.47 15.34 10.24 22.59 11.72 17.02
 Non-metallic mineral products 4.01 11.01 7.97 19.13 5.01 15.69 10.51 17.57
 Basic metals & metal products 7.67 13.77 8.69 17.63 9.52 19.95 8.24 25.64
 General machinery 10.53 16.39 7.46 28.04 15.27 32.31 12.69 15.52
 Electronic machinery 13.21 21.00 9.11 13.83 17.13 31.07 9.31 32.80
 Transportation machinery 6.74 16.79 4.83 14.52 10.33 24.16 7.32 18.20
Note: See Table 1 for a precise definition of sample firms; workers with tertiary education are 
those who successfully completed college, university, or graduate school.
Source: Author's compilations from General Statistics Office (2011, 2013).
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Table 4: Shares of paid workers with secondary education in sample firms (percent)
2007 2009
Industry Private SOEs WFs JVs Private SOEs WFs JVs
11 sample industries 12.11 12.77 11.21 16.19 11.54 15.08 10.77 15.98
 Food & beverages 9.94 15.64 16.03 15.10 9.73 18.37 14.70 17.61
 Textiles 7.06 8.03 9.03 7.59 7.89 9.98 9.50 6.32
 Apparel, leather, & footwear 7.15 5.40 4.72 7.19 6.39 6.26 5.24 4.81
 Wood products & furniture 8.22 10.03 5.02 10.64 7.78 9.46 4.32 12.68
 Paper 12.00 10.86 11.06 21.21 10.65 11.22 9.93 27.78
 Chemicals, rubber, & plastics 14.97 14.64 14.62 19.37 14.53 14.90 12.98 17.60
 Non-metallic mineral products 8.78 11.77 10.15 17.93 9.74 11.84 15.47 21.42
 Basic metals & metal products 19.04 14.00 17.53 20.61 18.35 19.39 15.49 18.33
 General machinery 25.53 15.81 17.46 27.21 26.91 28.92 19.14 32.17
 Electronic machinery 26.09 16.40 15.01 20.43 23.33 17.49 13.04 18.70
 Transportation machinery 17.47 13.57 12.35 21.63 20.94 16.98 13.99 16.57
Note: See Table 1 for a precise definition of sample firms; workers with moderate education are 
those who successfully completed secondary school (12 years), but not tertiary education.
Source: Author's compilations from General Statistics Office (2011, 2013).
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Industry Private SOEs WFs JVs
11 sample industries 16.30 23.78 16.04 22.13
 Food & beverages 16.26 22.45 24.06 22.12
 Textiles 12.84 15.57 12.55 18.00
 Apparel, leather, & footwear 10.99 11.54 9.05 9.16
 Wood products & furniture 12.93 17.98 10.40 15.37
 Paper 16.83 15.88 16.02 31.62
 Chemicals, rubber, & plastics 21.52 27.32 21.52 24.87
 Non-metallic mineral products 14.30 22.31 18.83 22.23
 Basic metals & metal products 20.70 25.34 18.65 29.73
 General machinery 25.95 43.86 21.76 26.57
 Electronic machinery 25.50 33.06 16.95 27.23
 Transportation machinery 20.39 30.51 18.91 27.20
Table 5: Shares of workers in highly paid occupation in sample firms in 2009 (percent)
Source: Author's compilations from General Statistics Office (2011, 2013).
Note: See Table 1 for a precise definition of sample firms; highly paid occupations are 
defined as (1) managers and (2) professional, technical and supervisory employees. 
24
Independent variable, 
indicator
KI 0.0106 0.0034 0.0374 a 0.0114 a
RO 0.1817 a 0.1378 a 0.1955 a 0.1378 a
SH 0.0091 a 0.0089 a 0.0144 a 0.0143 a
SM 0.0008 b 0.0008 b 0.0014 a 0.0014 a
SF -0.0036 a -0.0036 a -0.0036 a -0.0035 a
SP 0.0035 a 0.0035 a not available
DW 0.2553 a 0.2502 a 0.2202 a 0.2071 a
DJ 0.2605 a 0.2492 a 0.2718 a 0.2543 a
DS 0.0974 a 0.0864 a 0.1456 a 0.1289 a
Test DW=DJ 247.56 a 239.95 a 111.57 a 99.54 a
Observations 10,698 10,698 10,221 10,221
R2 0.482 0.480 0.423 0.419
#industry dummies 28 28 28 28
Notes: a=signficant at the 1% level, b=significant at the 5% level, c=significant at the 
10% level; all estimates include 5 regional dummies and 53 industry dummies (see the 
text for definitions); theTestDFs rows show Wald tests of the hypothesis that 
coefficients on DW and DJ are equal and associated p-values; full results including the 
constant and all dummy coefficients are available from the authors.
2009 2007
Lagged Contem-poraneous Lagged
Contem-
poraneous
Table 6: OLS Estimates of slope ownership-related wage differentials and other slope 
coefficients from estimates of equation (1); all p-values based on robust standard 
errors; 11 sample industries combined
25
WF-private, 11 industries 0.2553 a 0.2502 a 0.2202 a 0.2071 a
  Food & beverages 0.2413 a 0.2447 a 0.2102 a 0.1858 a
  Textiles 0.3358 a 0.3237 a 0.2553 a 0.2461 a
  Apparel, leather, & footwear 0.1916 a 0.1872 a 0.1080 a 0.0962 b
  Wood products & furniture 0.2214 a 0.1923 a 0.1450 a 0.1207 a
  Paper 0.2029 a 0.1874 a 0.2896 a 0.2764 a
  Chemicals, rubber, & plastics 0.2995 a 0.3013 a 0.3206 a 0.3074 a
  Non-metallic mineral products 0.2177 a 0.2075 a 0.0972 0.0927
  Basic metals & metal products 0.3425 a 0.3357 a 0.3155 a 0.3076 a
  General machinery 0.4390 a 0.4620 a 0.3476 a 0.3353 a
  Electronic machinery 0.2170 a 0.2230 a 0.2340 b 0.2418 b
  Transportation machinery 0.2988 a 0.2758 a 0.4979 a 0.4808 a
JV-private, 11 industries 0.2605 a 0.2492 a 0.2718 a 0.2543 a
  Food & beverages 0.1672 a 0.1687 a 0.2039 a 0.1768 a
  Textiles 0.3599 b 0.3311 b 0.2260 b 0.2250 b
  Apparel, leather, & footwear 0.1350 a 0.1229 b 0.0999 0.0942
  Wood products & furniture 0.2462 a 0.2232 a 0.1422 c 0.1113
  Paper -0.8096 -0.8791 0.0799 0.0476
  Chemicals, rubber, & plastics 0.3352 a 0.3371 a 0.4785 a 0.4688 a
  Non-metallic mineral products 0.2561 a 0.2485 a 0.2354 b 0.2281 b
  Basic metals & metal products 0.3285 a 0.3162 a 0.4695 a 0.4485 a
  General machinery 0.3144 a 0.3184 a 0.1608 0.1416
  Electronic machinery 0.5908 a 0.5812 a 0.3721 b 0.3715 b
  Transportation machinery 0.3101 a 0.2760 a 0.4089 a 0.3556 b
Test WF-priv=JV-priv, 11 indus. 247.56 a 239.95 a 111.57 a 99.54 a
  Food & beverages 18.26 a 19.09 a 8.34 a 6.36 a
  Textiles 32.04 a 30.99 a 12.58 a 11.75 a
  Apparel, leather, & footwear 27.70 a 27.00 a 4.04 b 3.49
  Wood products & furniture 29.92 a 22.65 a 9.06 a 6.48 a
  Paper 8.22 a 6.57 a 8.09 a 7.32 a
  Chemicals, rubber, & plastics 56.08 a 56.75 a 50.44 a 49.04 a
  Non-metallic mineral products 15.04 a 13.59 a 3.35 b 3.23 b
  Basic metals & metal products 52.71 a 49.35 a 38.90 a 36.54 a
  General machinery 17.52 a 19.25 a 10.72 a 10.20 a
  Electronic machinery 19.68 a 19.53 a 4.97 a 5.50 a
  Transportation machinery 14.45 a 12.57 a 18.44 a 17.42 a
Table 7: Industry-level OLS estimates of ownership-related wage differentials from 
estimates of equation (1) ; all p-values based on robust standard errors
Lagged
2009
Contem-
poraneous
Differential, industry
2007
Lagged Contem-poraneous
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SOE-private, 11 industries 0.0974 a 0.0864 a 0.1456 a 0.1289 a
  Food & beverages 0.2021 a 0.1989 a 0.2111 a 0.1869 a
  Textiles 0.0022 -0.0061 -0.0877 -0.1119
  Apparel, leather, & footwear 0.0837 b 0.0621 0.0785 0.0534
  Wood products & furniture -0.0536 -0.0948 -0.0747 -0.0912
  Paper 0.1722 0.1624 -0.0051 -0.0675
  Chemicals, rubber, & plastics 0.2129 a 0.2129 a 0.4090 a 0.3941 a
  Non-metallic mineral products -0.0138 -0.0292 -0.0086 -0.0183
  Basic metals & metal products 0.0755 0.0652 0.2322 a 0.2088 a
  General machinery 0.1126 0.1188 0.0612 0.0680
  Electronic machinery 0.2410 a 0.2337 a 0.3393 b 0.3509 b
  Transportation machinery 0.0278 0.0234 0.2353 a 0.2195 a
Notes: a=signficant at the 1% level, b=significant at the 5% level, c=significant at the 
10% level; ; see Appendix Table 3  for other slope coefficients and indicators; full results 
including all coefficients and equation details are available from the authors.
Table 7 (continued)
Differential, industry 2009 2007Lagged Contem- Lagged Contem-
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Industry Privatefirms SOEs WFs JVs
Private
firms SOEs WFs JVs
 11 sample industries 1,239,236 357,645 1,047,385 148,857 1,347,540 310,052 1,320,188 143,227
  Food & beverages 238,522 49,858 45,254 20,875 286,290 38,925 52,697 25,812
  Textiles 61,577 34,213 49,520 6,921 62,786 20,829 55,204 3,195
  Apparel, leather, & footwear 367,003 78,407 583,782 52,445 376,043 58,959 726,102 44,695
  Wood products & furniture 174,483 20,401 97,545 8,125 176,407 12,812 116,657 7,416
  Paper 36,468 9,037 11,483 465 39,193 7,994 15,167 425
  Chemicals, rubber, & plastics 82,318 38,724 55,795 9,220 94,447 32,824 77,708 7,205
  Non-metallic mineral products 129,437 44,624 12,166 10,829 151,327 41,263 13,836 9,528
  Basic metals & metal products 76,947 26,924 37,397 6,345 82,546 30,426 53,257 6,401
  General machinery 22,173 7,297 9,309 614 23,824 7,888 11,314 722
  Electronic machinery 22,494 11,614 111,449 9,803 20,272 9,841 154,058 9,244
  Transportation machinery 27,818 36,548 33,686 23,218 34,408 48,293 44,189 28,586
Excluded industries and firms 196,129 108,658 181,356 4,792 263,814 64,775 188,568 6,699
Appendix Table 1: Paid employees in sample firms by ownership and industry (number) 
2007 2009
Note: Firms with viable data are those with positive paid workers, output, worker compensation, and fixed assets; samples 
exclude firms with less than 20 employees; excluded industries are tobacco, publishing and printing, petroleum products, and 
recycling. 
Source: Author's compilations from General Statistics Office (2011, 2013).
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Industry Privatefirms SOEs WFs JVs
Private
firms SOEs WFs JVs
11 sample industries 12.852 22.096 21.625 35.323 14.490 22.705 22.309 27.873
 Food & beverages 11.631 22.294 18.500 31.050 14.898 22.974 27.304 27.992
 Textiles 11.281 15.297 18.235 19.924 11.705 16.377 19.000 21.540
 Apparel, leather, & footwear 12.124 12.648 15.031 15.044 12.533 14.438 17.482 16.281
 Wood products & furniture 11.280 14.555 17.286 16.778 11.535 13.678 17.927 19.888
 Paper 12.554 19.794 18.364 28.949 14.420 23.242 23.230 13.718
 Chemicals, rubber, & plastics 14.676 32.765 34.277 48.460 17.133 31.105 28.456 31.868
 Non-metallic mineral products 12.032 20.593 17.082 39.813 14.097 25.062 23.540 29.115
 Basic metals & metal products 14.663 22.575 23.767 37.454 16.526 22.531 24.029 31.796
 General machinery 16.310 21.632 16.069 29.205 18.297 24.136 24.046 23.407
 Electronic machinery 16.087 30.318 44.431 46.397 20.106 30.078 22.396 43.588
 Transportation machinery 14.631 25.306 15.395 39.145 17.631 20.885 21.883 30.320
Appendix Table 2: Mean compensation per worker in sample firms by ownership and industry (million dong) 
2007 2009
Note: Firms with viable data are those with positive paid workers, output, worker compensation, and fixed assets; 
samples exclude firms with less than 20 employees; excluded industries are tobacco, publishing and printing, 
petroleum products, and recycling. 
Source: Author's compilations from General Statistics Office (2011, 2013).
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Industry Privatefirms SOEs WFs JVs
Private
firms SOEs WFs JVs
 11 sample industries 228,883 98,974 198,516 108,795 279,493 87,859 274,504 117,349
  Food & beverages 86,418 24,034 37,709 20,737 98,369 16,143 55,790 28,673
  Textiles 7,946 4,679 14,326 1,283 8,952 2,986 16,566 859
  Apparel, leather, & footwear 16,110 6,496 37,311 4,768 17,271 4,395 49,026 3,626
  Wood products & furniture 16,251 2,623 12,006 1,621 20,633 1,693 15,527 1,730
  Paper 6,992 2,798 3,987 157 10,162 2,481 6,171 210
  Chemicals, rubber, & plastics 25,909 17,336 21,527 12,373 31,122 17,201 35,188 6,019
  Non-metallic mineral products 15,814 15,287 3,409 9,115 18,567 13,129 3,456 7,933
  Basic metals & metal products 29,087 6,218 13,518 8,460 43,090 10,697 16,876 9,593
  General machinery 3,746 1,149 3,500 188 4,801 1,425 4,503 337
  Electronic machinery 11,286 7,362 35,923 12,071 12,274 6,685 51,263 11,396
  Transportation machinery 9,321 10,992 15,302 38,022 14,253 11,025 20,137 46,973
 Excluded industries 45,181 28,857 26,111 3,727 101,516 28,289 41,354 5,662
Appendix Table 3: Sales of sample firms by ownership and industry (trillion dong)
2007 2009
Note: Firms with viable data are those with positive paid workers, output, worker compensation, and fixed assets; samples 
exclude firms with less than 20 employees; excluded industries are tobacco, publishing and printing, petroleum products, and 
recycling. 
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Industry Privatefirms SOEs WFs JVs
Private
firms SOEs WFs JVs
 11 sample industries 7,665 531 1,699 326 7,611 517 2,249 322
  Food & beverages 1,353 115 145 55 1,337 104 164 59
  Textiles 366 31 153 17 416 28 191 11
  Apparel, leather, & footwear 878 46 363 41 871 45 489 40
  Wood products & furniture 1,145 36 168 29 1,245 28 224 32
  Paper 470 17 62 2 445 17 76 2
  Chemicals, rubber, & plastics 850 59 287 51 764 54 406 44
  Non-metallic mineral products 921 81 39 29 1,062 78 59 30
  Basic metals & metal products 1,010 44 187 43 880 55 267 46
  General machinery 242 19 51 6 196 19 63 7
  Electronic machinery 196 28 123 26 169 29 159 25
  Transportation machinery 234 55 121 27 226 60 151 26
 Excluded industries 1,767 278 545 43 3,400 177 717 50
Appendix Table 4: Number of sample firms by ownership and industry
2007 2009
exclude firms with less than 20 employees; excluded industries are tobacco, publishing and printing, petroleum products, and 
recycling. 
Source: Author's compilations from General Statistics Office (2011, 2013).
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Value P-val. Value P-val. Value P-val. Value P-val.
Food and beverages
KI 0.0109 0.604 0.0296 0.027 0.0878 0.000 0.0322 0.009
RO 0.1808 0.000 0.1541 0.000 0.2064 0.000 0.1445 0.000
SH 0.0123 0.000 0.0124 0.000 0.0181 0.000 0.0181 0.000
SM 0.0002 0.872 0.0002 0.870 -0.0022 0.228 -0.0021 0.241
SF -0.0019 0.011 -0.0020 0.006 -0.0031 0.000 -0.0030 0.000
SP 0.0039 0.001 0.0039 0.001
DW 0.2413 0.000 0.2447 0.000 0.2102 0.002 0.1858 0.005
DJ 0.1672 0.009 0.1687 0.008 0.2039 0.002 0.1768 0.009
DS 0.2021 0.000 0.1989 0.000 0.2111 0.000 0.1869 0.001
Test DW=DJ 18.26 0.000 18.21 0.000 8.34 0.001 6.36 0.003
Obs./R2 1,664 0.499 1,664 0.497 1,668 0.433 1,668 0.426
No. DI s 3 3 3 3
Textiles
KI 0.0465 0.130 0.0249 0.105 0.0461 0.103 0.0324 0.072
RO 0.1636 0.000 0.1244 0.000 0.2006 0.000 0.1128 0.000
SH 0.0152 0.001 0.0145 0.001 0.0254 0.000 0.0255 0.000
SM -0.0007 0.633 -0.0008 0.605 0.0023 0.373 0.0025 0.336
SF -0.0022 0.064 -0.0023 0.051 -0.0020 0.082 -0.0020 0.079
SP 0.0044 0.026 0.0045 0.025
DW 0.3358 0.000 0.3237 0.000 0.2553 0.000 0.2461 0.000
DJ 0.3599 0.013 0.3311 0.019 0.2260 0.020 0.2250 0.016
DS 0.0022 0.976 -0.0061 0.932 -0.0877 0.366 -0.1119 0.243
Test DW=DJ 32.04 0.000 18.21 0.000 12.58 0.000 11.75 0.000
Obs./R2 646 0.483 646 0.480 567 0.468 567 0.460
No. DI s 0 0 0 0
Apparel and leather products
KI 0.0050 0.734 -0.0070 0.458 0.0368 0.063 -0.0006 0.963
RO 0.1729 0.000 0.1179 0.000 0.1811 0.000 0.1175 0.000
SH 0.0041 0.130 0.0042 0.118 0.0123 0.002 0.0126 0.002
SM -0.0020 0.206 -0.0019 0.218 -0.0015 0.317 -0.0012 0.408
SF -0.0032 0.001 -0.0031 0.001 -0.0012 0.322 -0.0012 0.329
SP 0.0039 0.019 0.0037 0.028
DW 0.1916 0.000 0.1872 0.000 0.1080 0.004 0.0962 0.011
DJ 0.1350 0.010 0.1229 0.019 0.0999 0.162 0.0942 0.19
DS 0.0837 0.044 0.0621 0.133 0.0785 0.132 0.0534 0.3
Test DW=DJ 27.70 0.000 18.21 0.000 4.04 0.049 3.49 0.104
Obs./R2 1,445 0.391 1,445 0.386 1,328 0.281 1,328 0.2726
No. DI s 1 1 1 0
Appendix Table 5: OLS Estimates of Ownership-Related Wage Differentials and Other Slope 
Coefficients; all p-values based on robust standard errors
Contem-
poraneous
Contem-
poraneousLagged Lagged
not available
not available
not available
20072009
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Value P-val. Value P-val. Value P-val. Value P-val.
Wood products and furniture
KI 0.0550 0.001 0.0192 0.091 0.0535 0.002 0.0193 0.086
RO 0.2611 0.000 0.1561 0.000 0.1916 0.000 0.1496 0.000
SH 0.0092 0.003 0.0081 0.010 0.0121 0.000 0.0119 0.000
SM 0.0003 0.854 0.0003 0.827 0.0030 0.027 0.0030 0.024
SF -0.0053 0.000 -0.0053 0.000 -0.0052 0.000 -0.0051 0.000
SP 0.0084 0.000 0.0089 0.000
DW 0.2214 0.000 0.1923 0.000 0.1450 0.000 0.1207 0.000
DJ 0.2462 0.000 0.2232 0.000 0.1422 0.057 0.1113 0.130
DS -0.0536 0.378 -0.0948 0.127 -0.0747 0.399 -0.0912 0.297
Test DW=DJ 29.92 0.000 18.21 0.000 9.06 0.000 6.48 0.000
Obs./R2 1,529 0.477 1,529 0.460 1,378 0.385 1,378 0.379
No. DI s 1 1 1 1
Paper products
KI 0.0757 0.031 0.0094 0.642 0.0516 0.117 0.0123 0.501
RO 0.1201 0.000 0.1513 0.000 0.2713 0.000 0.1739 0.000
SH 0.0080 0.003 0.0089 0.001 0.0124 0.000 0.0133 0.000
SM -0.0001 0.977 0.0004 0.850 0.0019 0.299 0.0016 0.339
SF 0.0002 0.888 0.0004 0.756 -0.0015 0.193 -0.0013 0.257
SP 0.0030 0.109 0.0029 0.116
DW 0.2029 0.000 0.1874 0.001 0.2896 0.000 0.2764 0.000
DJ -0.8096 0.195 -0.8791 0.202 0.0799 0.413 0.0476 0.656
DS 0.1722 0.160 0.1624 0.191 -0.0051 0.977 -0.0675 0.721
Test DW=DJ 8.22 0.000 18.21 0.000 8.09 0.000 7.32 0.001
Obs./R2 540 0.417 540 0.404 551 0.415 551 0.401
No. DI s 0 0 0 0
Chemical, Rubber and Plastics
KI -0.0085 0.617 0.0005 0.964 0.0355 0.096 0.0081 0.469
RO 0.1302 0.000 0.1275 0.000 0.2266 0.000 0.1362 0.000
SH 0.0101 0.000 0.0101 0.000 0.0150 0.000 0.0145 0.000
SM 0.0017 0.101 0.0017 0.095 0.0019 0.066 0.0019 0.060
SF -0.0015 0.013 -0.0015 0.013 -0.0008 0.239 -0.0008 0.279
SP 0.0040 0.000 0.0040 0.000
DW 0.2995 0.000 0.3013 0.000 0.3206 0.000 0.3074 0.000
DJ 0.3352 0.000 0.3371 0.000 0.4785 0.000 0.4688 0.000
DS 0.2129 0.001 0.2129 0.001 0.4090 0.000 0.3941 0.000
Test DW=DJ 56.08 0.000 18.21 0.000 50.44 0.000 49.04 0.000
Obs./R2 1,268 0.528 1,268 0.528 1,247 0.513 1,247 0.506
No. DI s 3 3 3 3
not available
not available
not available
Appendix Table 5 (continued)
2009 2007
Lagged Contem- Lagged Contem-
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Value P-val. Value P-val. Value P-val. Value P-val.
Non-metallic mineral products
KI -0.0356 0.014 -0.0247 0.013 -0.0122 0.592 -0.0111 0.408
RO 0.2591 0.000 0.1956 0.000 0.2441 0.000 0.1966 0.000
SH 0.0090 0.000 0.0086 0.000 0.0114 0.053 0.0113 0.056
SM -0.0027 0.001 -0.0026 0.002 0.0017 0.247 0.0017 0.267
SF -0.0027 0.000 -0.0026 0.000 -0.0037 0.000 -0.0037 0.000
SP 0.0054 0.000 0.0058 0.000
DW 0.2177 0.000 0.2075 0.000 0.0972 0.263 0.0927 0.294
DJ 0.2561 0.000 0.2485 0.000 0.2354 0.013 0.2281 0.014
DS -0.0138 0.785 -0.0292 0.570 -0.0086 0.868 -0.0183 0.726
Test DW=DJ 15.04 0.000 18.21 0.000 3.35 0.036 3.23 0.040
Obs./R2 1,229 0.503 1,229 0.496 1,070 0.504 1,070 0.501
No. DI s 1 1 1 1
Basic metals & metal products
KI 0.0240 0.261 0.0105 0.409 0.0183 0.283 0.0106 0.343
RO 0.1481 0.000 0.1154 0.000 0.1898 0.000 0.1277 0.000
SH 0.0083 0.000 0.0081 0.000 0.0077 0.003 0.0077 0.003
SM 0.0003 0.682 0.0003 0.600 0.0012 0.203 0.0012 0.199
SF -0.0047 0.000 -0.0047 0.000 -0.0047 0.000 -0.0047 0.000
SP 0.0010 0.345 0.0010 0.339
DW 0.3425 0.000 0.3357 0.000 0.3155 0.000 0.3076 0.000
DJ 0.3285 0.000 0.3162 0.000 0.4695 0.000 0.4485 0.000
DS 0.0755 0.140 0.0652 0.201 0.2322 0.000 0.2088 0.001
Test DW=DJ 52.71 0.000 18.21 0.000 38.90 0.000 36.54 0.000
Obs./R2 1,248 0.386 1,248 0.384 1,284 0.336 1,284 0.331
No. DI s 3 3 3 3
General machinery
KI -0.0645 0.303 -0.0442 0.022 0.0535 0.077 0.0132 0.512
RO 0.0434 0.390 0.1012 0.000 0.1500 0.002 0.1491 0.000
SH 0.0057 0.002 0.0059 0.001 0.0134 0.000 0.0133 0.001
SM 0.0028 0.010 0.0028 0.011 0.0017 0.138 0.0018 0.122
SF -0.0073 0.000 -0.0075 0.000 -0.0054 0.000 -0.0054 0.000
SP 0.0031 0.043 0.0031 0.040
DW 0.4390 0.000 0.4620 0.000 0.3476 0.000 0.3353 0.000
DJ 0.3144 0.010 0.3184 0.008 0.1608 0.446 0.1416 0.496
DS 0.1126 0.164 0.1188 0.140 0.0612 0.573 0.0680 0.533
Test DW=DJ 17.52 0.000 18.21 0.000 10.72 0.000 10.20 0.000
Obs./R2 285 0.447 285 0.441 318 0.442 318 0.438
No. DI s 0 0 0 0
Appendix Table 5 (continued)
2009 2007
Lagged Contem- Lagged Contem-
not available
not available
not available
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Value P-val. Value P-val. Value P-val. Value P-val.
Electronic machinery
KI -0.0011 0.980 0.0052 0.799 0.0570 0.397 0.0441 0.190
RO 0.1213 0.000 0.0820 0.000 0.0351 0.385 0.0632 0.016
SH 0.0083 0.000 0.0081 0.000 0.0175 0.000 0.0176 0.000
SM 0.0005 0.752 0.0005 0.745 0.0046 0.002 0.0045 0.003
SF -0.0042 0.001 -0.0043 0.000 -0.0030 0.009 -0.0030 0.010
SP 0.0036 0.097 0.0037 0.090
DW 0.2170 0.000 0.2230 0.000 0.2340 0.018 0.2418 0.020
DJ 0.5908 0.000 0.5812 0.000 0.3721 0.019 0.3715 0.014
DS 0.2410 0.005 0.2337 0.006 0.3393 0.016 0.3509 0.013
Test DW=DJ 19.7 0.000 18.2 0.000 5.0 0.008 5.5 0.004
Obs./R2 382 0.437 382 0.435 373 0.347 373 0.346
No. DI s 4 4 4 4
Transportation machinery
KI -0.0143 0.608 -0.0586 0.000 0.0108 0.811 -0.0412 0.146
RO 0.1471 0.000 0.1089 0.000 0.1885 0.000 0.1193 0.000
SH 0.0050 0.017 0.0046 0.029 0.0114 0.004 0.0118 0.004
SM 0.0019 0.087 0.0020 0.075 0.0006 0.741 0.0006 0.755
SF -0.0031 0.008 -0.0030 0.009 -0.0053 0.002 -0.0055 0.001
SP 0.0013 0.327 0.0016 0.221
DW 0.2988 0.000 0.2758 0.000 0.4979 0.000 0.4808 0.000
DJ 0.3101 0.000 0.2760 0.001 0.4089 0.005 0.3556 0.012
DS 0.0278 0.619 0.0234 0.677 0.2353 0.004 0.2195 0.008
Test DW=DJ 14.5 0.000 18.2 0.000 18.4 0.000 17.4 0.000
Obs./R2 462 0.431 462 0.424 437 0.376 437 0.368
No. DI s 1 1 1 1
Note: in the Obs./R2 rows, the coefficient column contains the number of observations and the P-
value column contains the R-squared; all estimates include 5 regional dummies; see the text for 
definitions or region and industry dummies; the Test DFs rows show Wald tests of the hypothesis 
that coefficients on DW and DJ are equal and associated p-values; and full results including the 
constant and all dummy coefficients are available from the authors.
Appendix Table 5 (continued)
2009 2007
Lagged Contem- Lagged Contem-
not available
not available
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Industry name VSIC Categories included
Manufacturing Sum or Mean of 11 sample industries and excluded industries below
 11 sample industries Sum or Mean of 11 sample industries below
  Food & beverages VSIC 15
  Textiles VSIC 17
  Apparel, leather, & footwear VSIC 18 & 19
  Wood products & furniture VSIC 20 & 361
  Paper, printing, & publishing VSIC 21
  Chemicals, rubber, & plastics VSIC 24 & 25
  Non-metallic mineral products VSIC 26
  Basic metals & metal products VSIC 27 & 28 
  General machinery VSIC 29
  Electronic machinery VSIC 30,31,32 &33
  Transportation machinery VSIC 34 & 35
 Excluded industries VSIC 16, 22, 23, 369 & 37
Appendix Table 6: VSIC Categories included in each industry group
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Applendix Table 7: Nominal minimum wages per month in Vietnam, 2000-2010 (thousand dong)
Year 2000-01 2002 2003-04 2005 2006-07 2008 2009 2010
Domestic firms
 Region 1 620 800 980
 Region 2 580 740 880
 Region 3 540 690 810
 Region 4 540 650 730
MNEs 2006-07 2008 2009 2010
 Region 1 870 1000 1200 1,340
 Region 2 790 900 1080 1,190
 Region 3 710 800 950 1,040
 Region 4 710 800 920 1,000
Notes: 
(3) Regions are defined as follows:
Region 1 : Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City.
Sources: Vietnamese government degrees compiled by Nguyen (2014, p. 52).
180 210 290 350 450
(2) Region-specipfic, minimum wage rates did not change for MNEs in 2000-05.
Region 2 : Hai Phong, Dong Nai, Binh Duong, Ba Ria Vung Tau, Quang Ninh, Da Nang, and Can 
Region 3 : Other provinces.
Region 4 : Bac Kan, Binh Phuoc, Dak Nong, Lai Chau, and Tay Ninh.
2000-2005
626
556
487
487
(1) Minimum wage rates were uniform for all domestic firms regardless of firm location in 2000-07.
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Chapter 2 
 
Ownership-related Wage Differentials by Occupation 
in Vietnamese Manufacturing  
 
  Kien Trung Nguyen*, The University of Danang, School of Economics 
and 
Eric D. Ramstetter, Asian Growth Research Institute and Kyushu University 
 
 
2.1.  Introduction  
Casual observation and descriptive statistics indicate that foreign multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) often pay higher average wages than domestic firms or plants in manufacturing 
industries of host, developing economies. Rigorous statistical analyses of plant-level data for 
Indonesia (Lipsey and Sjöholm 2004; Ramstetter and Narjoko 2013) and Malaysia 
(Ramstetter 2014), as well as firm-level data for Vietnam (Nguyen and Ramstetter 2015; Phan 
and Ramstetter 2007) also suggest that positive wage differentials often remain statistically 
significant after accounting for the influences of worker education and/or occupation, and 
plant or firm capital- or input-intensity and size.1 Studies of households and internal migrants 
in Vietnam (Fukase 2014a, 2014b) also provide evidence that MNEs pay relatively high 
wages and attract immigrants after accounting for individual characteristics.  
Of these studies, only analyses of Indonesia have been able to estimate MNE-local wage 
differentials for different types of workers. In Indonesia, wage differentials between MNEs 
and local, private plants (excluding plants belonging to state-owned enterprises, SOEs) tended 
to be larger for relatively high wage, non-production workers than for production workers. 
Conditional differentials were also statistically significant when estimated in large samples of 
manufacturing plants. At the industry level, MNE-private differentials also tended to be larger 
                                                 
1 Other studies of Malaysia (Lim 1977) and Thailand (Matsuoka-Movshuk and Movshuk 2006; Ramstetter 
2004) also found positive and significant wage differentials after controlling for differences in capital 
intensity and size, for example, but were unable to control for worker education or occupation. 
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for non-production workers and most conditional differentials were statistically significant in 
1996, but many were insignificant in 2006. Results from large samples of Thai manufacturing 
plants in 1996 also indicate MNE-local plant wage differentials were statistically significant 
and larger for non-production workers, but do not control for worker education or other 
measures of labour quality (Matsuoka-Movshuk and Movshuk 2006).  
Results from a small, stratified sample of 1,500 manufacturing and non-manufacturing 
firms in five large Chinese cities (Hale and Long 2011, pp. 417-419) contrast somewhat. 
These results are consistent in suggesting that firms with relatively large foreign ownership 
shares paid significantly higher wages to engineers and managers and that this differential was 
larger than for low-wage, ordinary workers. However, they were inconsistent because they 
find no significant effect of foreign ownership on wages of ordinary workers.2 Evidence on 
how MNE-local wage differentials vary among occupations remains scarce, however. 
We help fill this important gap in the literature by analysing data for Vietnamese 
manufacturing firms in 2009, the only year for which such data on wages and workers can be 
obtained by occupation. An important advantage of the Vietnamese data is that they allow 
disaggregation of non-production workers into lowly paid and highly paid occupations, 
whereas previous studies have usually interpreted non-production workers as white collar or 
relatively highly paid and skilled workers. The analysis also pays close attention to variation 
in MNE-private wage differentials among industries, which many of the above-mentioned 
studies indicate are quite important. Although the study has well-known shortcomings of 
cross sectional analyses, it is possible to lag key independent variables using 2008 data  and 
partially account for simultaneity issues often thought to affect such estimates. Perhaps more 
importantly, a previous study (Nguyen and Ramstetter 2015) has demonstrated that 
                                                 
2 Similar results suggest that MNE-local wage differentials were significant for skilled workers but not 
unskilled workers in Mexico in 1990 (Aitken et al. 1996, p. 367-368). 
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ownership-related wage differentials for all workers were qualitatively similar in 2007 and 
2009. This consistency is an important robustness check because firm-level data on worker 
education are only available in these years and because the macroeconomic environment was 
good in 2007, but poor in 2009.3 
Vietnam’s economy has three important characteristics with important implications for this 
and related analyses. First, even after doi moi (reform) that marked the transition away from a 
centrally controlled economy from 1986, SOEs have received preferential treatment and 
traditionally been designated to control capital-intensive industries thought to be key to the 
country’s development. Second, after the promulgation of the first foreign investment law in 
1988, MNEs have also been treated more favourably than local private firms. For example, 
Vietnam’s foreign investment laws also contain relatively few formal ownership restrictions. 
As a result, the vast majority of MNEs are wholly-foreign firms (WFs). On the other hand, 
many MNE joint ventures (JVs) involve SOE partners, making it important to distinguish JVs 
and WFs even though JVs are quite small.  
Third, Vietnam intensified emphasis on outward-oriented economic liberalization in the 
early 21st century. Important measures included the promulgation of the Enterprise Law in 
2000, the negotiation of the Bilateral Trade Agreement with the United States in 2001, the 
implementation of many commitments made under the ASEAN (Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations) Free Trade Area (AFTA) by 2005 or shortly thereafter, and further revisions 
to the Enterprise Law and related Investment Laws that eventually led to WTO (World Trade 
Organization) accession in 2006. Correspondingly, by 2009, the economy was substantially 
more open and competitive than even five years previous.  
                                                 
3 For example, the growth rate of real manufacturing GDP plummeted from over 12.4 percent in 2007 to 
9.8 percent in 2008 and only 2.8 percent in 2009, while the growth of the manufacturing deflator 
skyrocketed from 4.5 percent in 2007 to 13.2 percent in 2008 and 7.3 percent in 2009 (data downloaded 
from www.gso.gov.vn on 22 January 2014).  
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In this paper, we first review the literature on MNE-local wage differentials, focusing on 
why wage differentials might differ among occupations (Section 2). Subsequently, we 
describe the enterprise data used for the analysis, focusing on patterns of unconditional 
differentials in wages and worker skills between MNEs and private firms (Section 3). Then 
we test if wage differentials are statistically significant after accounting for firm size, capital 
intensity, worker sex, and worker education in 2009 (Section 4). Finally, Section 5 offers 
some conclusions and suggestions for future research. 
 
2.2.  Literature Review and Methodology4 
There is a compelling theoretical rationale suggesting that MNEs will often pay higher 
wages than corresponding domestic enterprises in host developing economies. On the demand 
side, MNEs are often argued to possess large amounts of knowledge-based, generally 
intangible assets such as production technology, marketing networks and management 
systems. Possession of these firm-specific assets suggests that MNEs will be likely to be more 
efficient than non-MNEs, which is reflected by larger firm size, higher factor productivity and 
factor returns, and/or higher capital or technology intensity.  
Many MNEs also require their employees, even relatively unskilled staff, to have 
engineering, marketing, and foreign language skills required to work with particular 
machinery and clients. In addition, many of these employees need to learn modern work 
disciplines, such as punctuality, tidiness and promptness, which may not be valued as highly 
in local firms. Firms operating in developing economies like Vietnam often face shortages of 
skilled workers who have both engineering, foreign language, and modern management skills. 
MNEs relative unfamiliarity with local labor markets may make it more difficult for them to 
                                                 
4 Portions of this section draw heavily on Nguyen and Ramstetter (2015, Section 2). 
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hire new skilled workers, or retain current skilled workers than domestic firms. This may also 
motivate MNEs to pay relatively high wages as an incentive to increase the attractiveness of 
their firms to skilled workers or to reduce turnover.  
On the supply side, workers may prefer to work for locally owned firms because they are 
more familiar with local management practices. In Vietnam, for example, it is clear that labor 
market practices often vary greatly between MNEs and local firms. Nonetheless, our 
impression is that most Vietnamese workers are not very opposed to working for MNEs and 
many might actually prefer MNE employment to the alternatives. This is supported by studies 
which suggest that internal migrants in Vietnam often prefer to work for MNEs over local 
firms (Fukase 2014b). 
It is often difficult to fully account for worker quality when examining MNE-local wage 
differentials in samples of plant- or firm-level data. This is because very few plant- or firm-
level data sets contain information on key determinants of wages such as experience or human 
capital investment, which are used as in standard Mincer equations of wage determination. In 
this study, we proxy human capital investment with measures of workforce educational 
attainment, but we do not have data on other aspects of human capital formation or worker 
experience. More importantly, as in other studies of this nature, we are forced to estimate 
average wages at the firm level, not for individual workers. Thus, we are not modelling how 
wages vary among workers but how average wages vary among firms and occupations.  
Some of the most comprehensive analyses of wage differentials to date have examined 
Indonesian manufacturing plants in 1996 and 2006 (Lipsey and Sjöholm 2004; Ramstetter and 
Narjoko 2013). These studies are particularly relevant here because they estimate separate 
Mincer-type wage equations at the plant level for production workers and non-production 
workers. Non-production workers include managers, technicians, and other professionals, and 
generally earn much more than production workers. More importantly, the Indonesian 
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evidence suggests that the wage gap between non-production and production workers was 
larger for MNEs than for private plants. 5 Equivalently, as described in the introduction, both 
unconditional and conditional MNE-private wage differentials were larger for non-production 
workers than for production workers, and differentials were positive and significant for both 
types of workers. For a small sample of Chinese firms in five large cities, Hale and Long 
(2011) also found qualitatively similar results that foreign ownership had a stronger impact on 
wages of managers and professionals than ordinary workers. However, their results differed 
from those for Indonesia because foreign ownership had no significant effect on the wages of 
ordinary workers. Velde and Morrissey (2003) also found a tendency for MNE-local wage 
differentials to be positive and larger for relatively skilled workers in five African countries.  
Why do these studies suggest that foreign ownership has larger effects on the wages of 
relatively skilled workers earning relatively high wages? Three distinct possibilities seem 
conspicuous. First, skilled workers are more likely than unskilled workers to be able to utilize 
the MNEs knowledge-based, generally intangible assets MNEs possess in relatively large 
amounts compared to non-MNEs. Because they are better able to utilize these assets, skilled 
workers probably experience larger increases in labor productivity, and thus wages, by 
moving from private firms to MNEs, for example, than do unskilled workers. The second 
possibility is mundane and statistical, but probably just as important. Namely, skilled workers 
are by definition more heterogeneous than unskilled workers and it is thus likely that controls 
for labor quality such as educational background capture variation in labor quality better for 
unskilled workers than for skilled ones. A third possibility is that estimates of ownership-
                                                 
5 In Ramstetter and Narjoko’s (2013, pp. 25-26, 41-42) large samples of medium large plants in Indonesia, 
for example, ratios of wages earned by non-production workers to those of production workers were 2.11 
for private plants and 2.61 for MNEs in 1996 and 1.82 and 1.99, respectively, in 2006. Corresponding 
unconditional, MNE-private wage differentials were 201 percent for non-production workers and 144 
percent for production workers in 1996, and 84 and 69 percent, respectively, in 2006. When estimated in 
large samples of all plants combined, corresponding conditional differences were 34 and 26 percent, 
respectively, in 1996 and 15 and 3.5 percent, respectively, in 2006. 
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related differentials include monopoly rents in markets for highly valued managers and 
technicians or professionals, for example, because these labor markets may better be 
characterized as a series of bilateral monopolies rather than perfectly competitive markets.  
Correspondingly, larger portions of observed, MNE-local differentials for skilled workers can 
probably be explained by unmeasured aspects of labor quality and labor market imperfections. 
In Vietnam, it is also important that MNEs are required to pay higher minimum wages than 
private companies.6 Because minimum wages affect unskilled workers more than skilled ones, 
they reduce the extent to which MNE-private differentials for skilled workers exceed 
differentials for unskilled workers. On the other hand, minimum wage requirements only 
affect base salaries, and domestic firms often pay higher bonuses than MNEs.7  
 
 
2.3. The Data, Wage Differentials and Worker Quality 
This study analyzes medium-large firms (20 or more employees) included in Vietnam’s 
Annual Enterprise Surveys for 2009 (General Statistics Office 2011, 2013). The 2009 data are 
the focus because this is the only year for which information on the number of workers and 
wages by occupation is available.8 Because lagged variables are used in on specification, 
values are expressed in 2000 prices.9 Wages are defined to include regular salaries and other 
                                                 
6 For example, in 2006-2007 minimum wages in WFs and JVs were 58-93 percent higher than in domestic 
firms (private firms and SOEs combined), depending on the region. In 2009, these differentials declined to 
38-50 percent. Foreign-domestic differentials in minimum wages were largest in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh 
City and smallest in rural areas (Nguyen 2014). 
7 See Appendix Table See Asian Development Bank Institute newsletter of 23 October 2013; received by 
email on that date. 
8 In addition, only 2009 and 2007 surveys have information on employee education. 
9 Output is converted using a manufacturing output deflator at the two-digit level of Vietnam’s Standard 
Industrial Classification. Capital is converted using the deflator is for fixed-capital formation from the 
national accounts (General Statistics Office various years a, various years b). Real wages are calculated 
using the consumer price index (CPI). 
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compensation such as bonuses and subsidies, but exclude employer contributions to social 
insurance (e.g., social security, health insurance, and pension insurance).  
Most MNEs, including both wholly-foreign MNEs (WFs) and JVs, and SOEs are medium- 
or large-sized firms. These medium-large firms differ in many respects from smaller firms, 
which are predominantly private. Therefore, it is more meaningful to compare wages among 
medium-large manufacturing firms with a workforce of at least 20 employees. In addition to 
making the comparison more consistent and economically meaningful, excluding small firms 
also allows us to remove most outliers and firms reporting implausible data.10 The analysis 
also excludes firms reporting implausible data (non-positive values from sales, worker 
compensation, and fixed assets, as well as firms in five industries with very few MNEs and/or 
SOEs (tobacco; publishing and printing; petroleum and gas; miscellaneous manufacturing; 
and recycling). Finally, because the purpose of this study is to compare MNE-private wage 
differentials among occupations, it also makes sense to further restrict the samples to firms 
reporting positive workers and compensation for each occupation.  
These constraints reduce the sample to 7,795 firms with 2.70 million paid workers (Table 
1). Paid employment in this sample amounted to 66 percent of the 4.09 million employees in 
manufacturing firms as reported in published compilations of the enterprise survey data 
(General Statistics Office 2011, 2013).11 This sample is thus a large cross section and broadly 
representative of Vietnam’s medium-large firms in 2009. On the other hand, comparisons of 
enterprise and labor force survey data suggest there were about 2.77 million manufacturing 
employees not covered by the enterprise surveys, most of whom probably worked for 
household enterprises excluded from the enterprise survey. 
                                                 
10 In addition, only limited information is collected from very small local firms with 10 or fewer employees 
(Jammal et al., 2006). 
11 This sample is substantially smaller than the sample of 10,698 firms with 3.12 million paid workers used 
in Nguyen and Ramstetter (2015) because that study includes firms that had zero paid employees or wages 
for any one of the four occupation categories, whereas this study excludes such firms. 
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As mentioned above, there has been a substantial policy bias in favor of SOEs and MNEs 
in Vietnam. Partially as a result of this legacy, MNEs and SOEs have played relatively large 
roles in Vietnam’s manufacturing industries. Reflecting efforts to privatize many SOEs and 
stimulate private business, the enterprise data suggest SOE shares declined markedly after 
2000 but national accounts data suggest only small reductions in SOE shares after 2000.12 
Partially because there are few ownership restrictions, WFs account for almost all MNE 
activity in Vietnamese manufacturing.  
In 2009, private firms had the largest payrolls in the 11 sample industries (1.14 million paid 
workers), followed closely by WFs (1.13 million), and distantly by SOEs and JVs (0.29 
million and 0.13 million, respectively; Table 1). WF employment was concentrated in labor-
intensive industries such as apparel, leather, and footwear, electronic machinery, and wood 
and furniture. JV employment was also heavily concentrated in a few industries, namely the 
apparel group, transportation machinery, and food and beverages. In contrast, private firm 
employment was more evenly disbursed across a range of industries, led by the apparel group, 
food and beverages, wood and furniture, and non-metallic mineral products. SOEs also 
employment was also evenly spread among a number of industries led by the apparel group, 
transportation machinery, non-metallic mineral products, food and beverages, the chemicals 
group, and the metals group. 
As might be expected in a sample of manufacturing firms, production workers was by far 
the largest category, accounting for an average of just over 80 percent of all paid workers in 
SOEs, 82 percent in JVs, 84 percent in private firms, and 87 percent in WFs (Table 1). Shares 
of all lowly paid workers, defined as production workers plus clerical and support workers, 
varied in a narrower range, from 85 percent in SOEs and 86 percent in JVs to 88 percent in 
private firms and 90 percent in WFs. Lowly paid worker shares were 89 percent or higher in 
                                                 
12 See Ramstetter and Phan (2013, pp. 31-32) for more details. 
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textiles (private firms, SOEs, WFs), the apparel group (private firms, SOEs, WFs), the wood 
group (private firms, WFs, JVs),  electronic machinery (WFs), and transportation machinery 
(JVs). In other words, a very large portion of paid employment in Vietnam’s manufacturing is 
generated by firms that depend heavily on relatively lowly paid workers.  
Professionals and technicians was the second largest category which accounted for an 
average of 11 percent of paid workers in SOEs, 8.5 percent in JVs, 8.2 percent in private firms, 
and 6.5 percent in WFs (Table 1). Shares of this group were 10 percent or more for at least 
one category in eight of the 11 industry categories, the exceptions being three industries 
heavily dependent on low wage labor (textiles, the apparel group, wood and furniture). The 
smallest occupation was managers, and the largest mean share was in JVs (5.2 percent), 
followed rather distantly by SOEs (4.2 percent), private firms (3.9 percent), and WFs (3.7 
percent). Relatively high manager shares (6 percent or more) were observed for JVs in three 
industries (apparel, chemicals, and non-metallic mineral products), for private firms in two 
(the metals group and general machinery, and in one for SOEs (electronic machinery). 
In a large sample of the 11 industries combined, mean compensation was almost identical 
for production workers and clerical and support workers in private firms (13.9 million dong or 
about US$815 per year; Table 2). For production workers, WFs paid a mean of 22 percent 
more than private firms, while SOEs paid 38 percent more, and JVs 48 percent more. For 
clerical and support workers, wage differentials were similar for SOEs, 33 percent, but much 
larger in WFs and JVs, 56 and 68 percent, respectively. In other words, WFs and JVs paid 
more for their clerical and support staff relative to production workers than did SOEs or 
private firms, which paid no premium for clerical and support workers. This suggests that 
WFs and JVs may require relatively skilled, high wage clerical and support services 
comparted to SOEs or private firms.  
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In private firms, professionals and technicians earned an average of 34 percent more than 
production, clerical, and support workers, while managers earned an average 2.96 times more 
than lowly paid production or clerical and support workers (Table 2). The SOE-private 
differential for professionals and technicians was also about one-third, but the corresponding 
differential for managers was only 5 percent. In contrast, WF- and JV-private differentials 
were relatively large for professionals and technicians (78 and 87 percent, respectively) and 
highest for managers (106 and 124 percent, respectively). In other words, as in previous 
studies, MNE-private wage differentials were larger in highly paid occupations than in lowly 
paid occupations.  
At the industry level, there was substantial variation in these patterns (Table 2). For 
example, production worker wage differentials were negative (indicating higher wages in 
private firms) for SOEs and WFs in wood and furniture, JVs in paper, WFs in electronic 
machinery, and SOE and WFs in transportation machinery. On the other hand, production 
worker wages were highest in six of the 11 industries for JVs and four industries for SOEs, 
but only in one for WFs. Thus, at the industry level, there was a tendency for JVs to pay 
production workers the most, followed by SOEs, WFs, and lastly private firms. Although 
clerical and support workers were also lowly paid, JVs paid the highest wages in only four 
industries compared to six for WFs and one for SOEs. For clerical and support workers, there 
were only two negative wage differentials, for SOEs in the apparel group and JVs in paper. 
In the highly paid occupations, negative differentials were also sparse being observed 
among professionals and technicians in SOEs in the apparel group and in wood and furniture 
and among managers in all groups in the apparel group, and SOEs in general machinery. JVs 
paid the highest wages to professionals and technicians in seven of the 11 industries but the 
highest wages to managers in only four industries. WFs paid the highest wages to professional 
and technician wages in the remaining four industries and the highest managerial wages in the 
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other seven industries. For the high wage occupations, wages in SOE exceeded WFs 
(technical and professional workers in chemicals) or JVs (managerial workers in paper) in 
only two cases.  
One important weakness of the Vietnamese data is that it is not possible to measure 
educational attainment for each type of worker. Rather, the variable is only collected for all 
workers combined (Table 3). When the 11 sample industries are combined, shares of paid 
workers who completed tertiary education were much higher in SOEs and JVs (18 and 17 
percent, respectively) than in WFs and private firms (7.8 percent in each). SOEs also had the 
highest tertiary shares in seven industries while JVs had the highest in the remaining four. 
Tertiary shares were lowest WFs in seven industries, in private firms in three, and in JVs in 
one industry. In short, there was a strong tendency for WFs and private firms to hire relatively 
large shares of lowly paid workers who did not finish tertiary education compared to SOEs 
and JVs. 
  
2.4. Results of Estimating Earnings Equations by Occupation 
The previous literature and the data presented above suggest that the ownership-related 
wage differentials in the manufacturing sector are related to worker education and 
occupational differences among ownership groups. The literature also suggests that other firm 
characteristics such as size, capital intensity, and the share of females in the workforce in paid 
employees may also influence the extent of wage differentials. Therefore, in this section we 
continue with an econometric analysis to examine the extent to which ownership-related wage 
differentials vary among occupations after controlling for the influences of worker education, 
occupation, and sex, as well as firm capital intensity and size. Similar to previous studies, we 
estimate the following model:  
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ln൫ܴ ௜ܹ௝௞൯ ൌ ܽ଴ ൅ ܽଵ ln൫ܭܫ௜௝൯ ൅ ܽଶ ln൫ܴ ௜ܱ௝൯ ൅ ܽଷܵܪ௜௝ ൅ ܽସܵܯ௜௝ 
൅ܽହܵܨ௜௝ ൅ ܽ଺ܦ ௜ܹ௝ ൅ ܽ଻ܦܬ௜௝ ൅	଼ܽܦ ௜ܵ௝ ൅ ߝ௜௝            (1) 
 
where 
RWijk= Average real wage of firm i of industry j for worker group k. 
ROij= Real output of firm i of industry j. 
KIij= Capital intensity of firm i of industry j, measured as the ratio of fixed capital 
stock over employment after deflating capital stock at a constant value. 
SHij= A share of highly educated employees in total employment of firm i of 
industry j (per cent).  
SMij= A share of moderately educated employees in total employment of firm i of 
industry j (per cent). 
SFij= A share of female employees in total employment of firm i of industry j (per 
cent). 
DWij= A dummy for wholly-owned, foreign-invested enterprises (wholly foreign 
firms – WF), taking a value of one if a firm is wholly owned FIE and zero 
otherwise. 
DJij= A dummy for joint venture enterprises (JV), taking a value of one if a firm is 
FIE joint venture and zero otherwise. 
DSij= A dummy for state-owned enterprises (SOE), taking a value of one if a firm 
is state-owned and zero otherwise. 
ߝ௜௝= A stochastic error term. 
 
All estimates also include vectors of dummy variables identifying seven regions and as many 
as 28 industries, usually defined at the two- or  three-digit level of Vietnam’s Standard 
Industrial Classification (VSIC) to account for region-specific and industry-specific 
influences on the constant which are not captured by the firm-level variables.13 Industry-
specific effects on constants and slopes are also accounted for in more detail by estimating 
equations for each of the 11 sample industries separately, as well as all 11 industries 
combined.  
                                                 
13 The regions are Hanoi, the Red River Delta, the North Mountainous Area, the Central Coast and Central 
Highland Area, the South East Area, Ho Chi Minh City, and the Mekong Delta (used as the base dummy). 
Industries are defined at the 3-digit level for industries having at least 2 firms of each ownership type in 
them; 3-digit categories are combined or 2-digit categories used in industries with fewer firms.  
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  Coefficients on capital intensity (a1) and real output (a2) are expected to be positive because 
capital-intensive and large firms generally pay higher wages than labor-intensive or small 
firms. Coefficients on the shares of highly or moderately educated workers (a3, a4) should 
also be positive because they suggest higher worker quality in firms with relatively high 
shares. In contrast, the coefficient on the share of female workers (a5) is likely to be negative 
because firms with a higher proportion of female workers tend to have lower average wages 
in Vietnam and many other economies.14 Finally, if wage differentials between WFs JVs, and 
SOEs, on the one hand, and private firms, on the other, persist after controlling for worker 
education, occupation, and sex, as well as firm size and capital intensity, the signs of the 
coefficients on DW, DJ, and DS (a6, a7, a8) will be positive.  
Because data on wages by worker occupation are only available for 2009, we focus on 
estimates for this year, Because of data constraints, estimates are performed in cross sections, 
which mean that exponential value of the coefficients on DW, DJ, and DS can be interpreted 
as conditional wage differentials similar to the unconditional differentials in Table 2. 
However, it is also possible that wages could influence firm’s capital intensity and size, 
creating potential simultaneity between the dependent and independent variables. To check 
for the robustness of the results to simultaneity concerns, estimates of both contemporaneous 
and lagged specifications, where capital intensity and output are lagged one year, are 
compared. All estimates use robust standard errors to account for heteroskedasiticity that can 
be expected when firm-level, scale variables (e.g., output, capital intensity) are used.  
In large samples of firms in all 11 industries combined, estimated coefficients were 
generally consistent with expectations, with two notable exceptions (Table 4). First, the 
coefficient on capital intensity which was insignificant at the standard 5 percent level in all 
                                                 
14 Females tend to earn less than males because they tend to be less educated and have less experience in 
high paying jobs, and because they are discriminated against in the workplace and when educational 
resources are allocated.  
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three non-production worker categories and in the contemporaneous specification for 
production workers. Second, the coefficient the share of workers with moderate education 
was negative and significant (managers and clerical and support workers) or weakly 
significant at the 10 percent level (professionals and technicians) for the three non-production 
worker categories, but positive and significant for production workers. In other words, firms 
with large shares of moderately educated workers tended to pay relatively high wages to 
production workers but relatively low wages to the three non-production worker categories. 
Although unexpected, this result is plausible, suggesting that high school education alone 
leads to lower wages for non-production workers, but to higher wages for production workers. 
This result is probably related to relatively high levels of educational attainment in Vietnam 
compared to other economies with similar per capita GDP, for example. On the other hand, 
larger firms, firms with relatively large tertiary shares, and firms with relatively small female 
shares all paid significantly higher wages to all worker classes. Goodness of fit measures (R2) 
ranged from 0.21 to 0.34 for the four types of labor, which is typical in large cross sections 
such as these. 
Conditional, ownership-related differentials were also positive and usually significant 
statistically, the sole exception being the SOE-private differential for managers (Table 4). JVs 
paid the highest wages for all three non-production worker categories, 77-78 percent more 
than private firms for managers, 36 percent more for professionals and technicians, and 28 
percent more for clerical and support workers (Table 4). For WFs, corresponding differentials 
with private firms were smaller but of similar magnitude, 72, 32, and 23-24 percent, 
respectively. Although small, differences in JV-private and WF-private differentials were 
statistically significant, however. Perhaps most importantly, however, there is a tendency for 
mean wage differentials between MNEs (both WFs and JVs) and private firms to be larger in 
high-wage occupations than in low-wage occupations.  
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This pattern is also relatively strong at the industry level for WFs and JVs. All estimates of 
WF-private conditional differences were positive and significant at 5 percent or better in all 
11 industries for managers, in all industries except general machinery for professionals and 
technicians, and in all but paper, non-metallic mineral products, and transportation machinery 
for clerical and support workers and production workers (Tables 5-6). These WF-private 
differentials were consistently at least one tenth larger for managers than for professionals and 
technicians in all 11 industries and at least one tenth larger for professionals and technicians 
than for clerical and support workers in seven industries.  
JV-private differentials were also positive and significant for high wage occupations, but 
there were a few industries where differentials were insignificant (the apparel group, paper, 
and general machinery) for managers or professionals and technicians (Table 5-6). Most JV-
private differentials were also largest for highly paid managers, but ordering among other 
occupations varied at the industry level. Wald tests of the hypothesis that WF-private and JV-
private differentials were equal were always rejected at the 5 percent level in large samples of 
all 11 industries combined and in most industry-occupation samples.  
For SOEs, most conditional differences were insignificant at the industry level (Tables 5-6). 
There were notable exceptions in food and beverages, where SOE-private differentials were 
positive for all four occupations, and in the chemicals group and electronic machinery, where 
there were positive and significant differentials for all occupations except managers. But in 
most industries and for most occupations, SOEs did not pay significantly more than private 
firms if the influences of worker education and sex and plant size and capital intensity are 
accounted for. 
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2.5. Conclusions and Future Research 
This paper began with a review of previous evidence that MNE-local wage differentials 
have often been found to remain positive even after accounting for the fact that MNEs tend to 
hire relatively high quality labor and to be large and capital intensive compared to local firms. 
When all sample firms were combined, simple comparisons suggest that average wages were 
highest in joint venture MNEs followed closely by wholly foreign MNEs. Unconditional JV-
private and WF-private wage differentials were 106-124 percent for managers, 78-87 percent 
for professionals and technicians, 56-68 percent for clerical and support workers, and 22-48 
percent for production workers. Corresponding, conditional wage differentials which account 
for the influences of worker education and sex, in addition to firm capital intensity and size, 
were positive and usually significant, but smaller, 72-78 percent for managers, 32-36 percent 
for professionals and technicians, 23-28 percent for clerical and support workers and 15-16 
percent for production workers. Conditional, SOE-private differentials were not significant 
for managers and relatively small (7-11 percent) for the three other occupations.  
When estimated at the industry-level, conditional WF-private differentials were positive 
and significant for most occupations and industries. JV-private differentials were also positive 
and significant in most industries for highly paid managers or professionals and technicians, 
but more often insignificant for lowly paid clerical and support workers or production workers. 
Most SOE-private differentials were also insignificant when estimated at the industry level. 
On the other hand, even at the industry level, there was a strong tendency for MNE-private 
differentials to be largest for managers than for professionals and technicians, and a somewhat 
weaker tendency for differentials to be larger for professionals and technicians than for 
clerical and support workers.  
In this sample of Vietnamese manufacturing firms, there was thus a tendency for MNE-
private differentials to be relatively large and/or more often positive and significant for 
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relatively high-wage occupations than for low-wage occupations. This pattern is consistent 
with the probability that relatively skilled workers are better able to increase productivity by 
using access to an MNE’s firm-specific assets than unskilled workers. It is also consistent 
with the possibility that estimated conditional differentials include aspects of worker quality 
not captured by workforce education or monopoly rents earned by prized managers and 
technicians or professionals, for example.  
Although these results have been obtained from a relatively small sample of 7,795 
manufacturers in 2009, it is important to emphasize that two key results are consistent with 
results from a previous study (Nguyen and Ramstetter 2015) estimating the mean wage 
differential for all workers combined, and using a much larger samples for two very different 
years, 2009 (10,698 firms) and 2007 (10,221 firms). First, JVs tend to pay the most, but 
conditional JV-private and WF-private differentials for all paid workers combined were of 
similar magnitude (23-31 percent), on average. Second, most SOE-private differentials were 
insignificant when estimated at the industry level, but most WF-private and JV-private 
differentials were positive and significant. The similarity of key results from this sample and 
larger samples in 2007 (a good year in Vietnamese manufacturing) and in 2009 (a very bad 
year), suggests that both samples are comprehensive enough to generate robust results.  
In short, these results provide further support for previous studies indicating that MNEs 
often pay significantly higher wages than local firms or plants, even after accounting 
important aspects of worker quality and other firm- or plant-level characteristics affecting 
wage determination. These results are important because they suggest there are important 
benefits accruing to workers in MNEs. On the other hand, the results of this and a few other 
studies suggest that MNE-private differentials are largest for a small number of workers in 
highly paid occupations and smallest for the large number of production workers. Another 
important pattern emerging from the data is that clerical and support workers earned 
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substantially more than production workers in JVs and in WFs (unconditional skill premiums 
of 14 and 28 percent, respectively), but about the same in private firms and less in SOEs.  
Although these results suggest MNE-private wage differentials are much larger for 
relatively few highly paid workers, we do not think this finding is strange in a capitalist labor 
market. And although there may be a case in favor of the argument for limiting salaries of top 
managers if labor market imperfections (e.g., the bilateral monopolies that often characterize 
markets for highly skilled workers) are judged to result in inefficiency or unfairly high wages, 
there is probably little rationale for treating top managers of MNEs any differently than top 
management in other high paying firms.  
Unfortunately, the lack of data on wage and paid workers by occupation for other years 
makes it difficult to extend these analyses in important ways. For example, it would be 
interesting to investigate how changes in ownership affect wages and employment and how 
these effects differ among occupations. Another important question is how MNE presence 
affects wage levels in domestic firms and if these spillovers differ among occupations? 
Unfortunately, rigorous analysis of issues raised these questions requires the use of panel data 
which will be impossible until data on wages and employment are collected by occupation for 
more years.  
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Industry Private firms SOEs WFs JVs
All paid workers, 11 sample industries 1,139,670 294,439 1,128,497 132,998
 Food & beverages 230,539 37,361 48,986 20,668
 Textiles 50,974 20,195 45,583 2,524
 Apparel, leather, & footwear 335,115 52,486 603,139 41,883
 Wood products & furniture 140,622 11,568 105,480 6,950
 Paper 30,765 7,756 11,631 430
 Chemicals, rubber, & plastics 80,726 32,500 66,325 6,866
 Non-metallic mineral products 127,660 39,785 10,985 9,542
 Basic metals & metal products 73,032 29,127 46,674 6,117
 General machinery 20,953 6,447 10,865 715
 Electronic machinery 19,293 9,543 137,533 8,689
 Transportation machinery 29,991 47,671 41,296 28,614
Excluded industries and firms 481,432 80,317 401,131 18,432
% Managers, 11 sample industries 3.86 4.19 3.72 5.16
  Food & beverages 3.78 4.76 4.45 4.43
  Textiles 2.92 3.32 3.52 4.60
  Apparel, leather, & footwear 2.55 2.50 3.40 7.59
  Wood products & furniture 3.72 3.22 3.08 3.60
  Paper 5.55 4.85 4.90 5.12
  Chemicals, rubber, & plastics 5.72 5.18 5.86 6.15
  Non-metallic mineral products 4.28 4.48 4.16 6.63
  Basic metals & metal products 6.21 5.26 5.07 5.82
  General machinery 6.47 5.23 5.61 4.90
  Electronic machinery 5.38 6.79 3.44 3.14
  Transportation machinery 4.30 3.86 4.35 2.31
 Excluded industries and firms 5.52 5.69 4.08 7.41
 Professionals & technicans, 11 sample industrie 8.17 10.69 6.51 8.51
  Food & beverages 8.55 10.39 15.38 10.04
  Textiles 7.07 7.65 5.58 8.40
  Apparel, leather, & footwear 5.75 5.64 4.92 5.03
  Wood products & furniture 6.08 9.37 5.03 6.22
  Paper 9.91 10.08 11.11 23.26
  Chemicals, rubber, & plastics 14.19 13.38 11.06 15.90
  Non-metallic mineral products 8.26 14.28 9.17 19.30
  Basic metals & metal products 12.36 11.01 9.20 14.55
  General machinery 11.60 13.17 10.38 9.51
  Electronic machinery 13.79 14.78 7.27 12.36
  Transportation machinery 9.27 12.03 8.10 4.99
 Excluded industries and firms 7.61 13.67 4.77 9.30
Table 1: Paid workers (number) and occupational shares of all workers (percent) by owner and 
industry
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Table 1 (continued)
Industry
Private 
firms SOEs WFs JVs
 Clerical & support workers, 11 sample industri 3.97 4.64 3.08 4.27
  Food & beverages 4.11 4.94 5.87 5.91
  Textiles 3.33 7.81 3.86 16.56
  Apparel, leather, & footwear 2.50 1.82 2.55 2.29
  Wood products & furniture 3.18 3.84 3.28 2.82
  Paper 5.56 3.92 4.42 3.49
  Chemicals, rubber, & plastics 6.04 6.93 4.63 5.69
  Non-metallic mineral products 4.86 3.99 6.47 4.57
  Basic metals & metal products 5.83 5.58 4.43 7.06
  General machinery 6.79 4.84 4.09 5.17
  Electronic machinery 6.27 7.16 2.14 5.01
  Transportation machinery 5.08 4.37 3.59 3.97
 Excluded industries and firms 2.71 4.63 3.28 4.96
Production workers,  11 sample industries 84.01 80.48 86.70 82.06
  Food & beverages 83.56 79.91 74.30 79.62
  Textiles 86.68 81.22 87.04 70.44
  Apparel, leather, & footwear 89.20 90.04 89.13 85.09
  Wood products & furniture 87.02 83.57 88.61 87.37
  Paper 78.99 81.15 79.57 68.14
  Chemicals, rubber, & plastics 74.05 74.51 78.45 72.25
  Non-metallic mineral products 82.59 77.25 80.20 69.49
  Basic metals & metal products 75.60 78.15 81.30 72.57
  General machinery 75.14 76.76 79.92 80.42
  Electronic machinery 74.57 71.28 87.15 79.49
  Transportation machinery 81.35 79.73 83.96 88.72
 Excluded industries 84.15 76.01 87.87 78.33
Note: Samples include firms with 20 or more paid workers and positive sales, worker 
compensation, and fixed assets; excluded industries are tobacco, publishing and printing, 
petroleum products, and recycling. 
Source: Author's compilations from firm-level data underlying General Statistics Office (2011, 
2013).
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Industry Private firms
SOE-
private
WF-
private
JV-
private
Managers, 11 sample industries 41.16 5 106 124
  Food & beverages 31.84 38 264 250
  Textiles 27.76 44 212 122
  Apparel, leather, & footwear 112.19 -73 -38 -59
  Wood products & furniture 28.05 17 187 164
  Paper 29.72 77 158 53
  Chemicals, rubber, & plastics 37.10 78 129 161
  Non-metallic mineral products 29.31 63 283 152
  Basic metals & metal products 30.86 21 168 189
  General machinery 32.29 -5 124 56
  Electronic machinery 39.20 31 165 328
  Transportation machinery 29.99 9 187 324
Professionals & technicans, 11 sample industrie 18.63 34 78 87
  Food & beverages 20.16 34 57 81
  Textiles 16.94 26 77 47
  Apparel, leather, & footwear 18.35 -7 81 37
  Wood products & furniture 16.93 -9 76 99
  Paper 17.64 41 160 107
  Chemicals, rubber, & plastics 21.29 60 55 68
  Non-metallic mineral products 17.59 46 83 107
  Basic metals & metal products 18.23 33 78 44
  General machinery 20.60 12 40 81
  Electronic machinery 20.39 57 116 119
  Transportation machinery 18.32 16 53 86
 Clerical & support workers, 11 sample industri 13.90 33 56 68
  Food & beverages 13.25 48 77 66
  Textiles 12.24 16 51 22
  Apparel, leather, & footwear 17.41 -24 13 8
  Wood products & furniture 12.06 11 96 40
  Paper 12.48 56 85 -18
  Chemicals, rubber, & plastics 14.17 85 79 62
  Non-metallic mineral products 13.29 32 25 69
  Basic metals & metal products 15.14 10 35 106
  General machinery 14.64 22 45 1
  Electronic machinery 14.70 98 67 99
  Transportation machinery 12.99 23 36 136
Table 2: Mean compensation per paid worker, excluding employer contributions to social 
insurance, in private firms reporting compensation, and unconditional owernship-related wage 
differentials by occupation, ownership, and industry
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Table 2 (continued)
Industry
Private 
firms SOEs WFs JVs
 Production workers,11 sample industries 13.88 38 22 48
  Food & beverages 13.59 41 45 61
  Textiles 11.22 18 28 52
  Apparel, leather, & footwear 11.52 9 25 19
  Wood products & furniture 14.30 -19 -1 11
  Paper 12.72 52 39 -73
  Chemicals, rubber, & plastics 14.67 65 41 50
  Non-metallic mineral products 13.60 66 38 59
  Basic metals & metal products 14.88 23 18 62
  General machinery 16.22 22 21 22
  Electronic machinery 18.06 44 -9 32
  Transportation machinery 17.87 -1 -11 29
Note: Samples include firms with 20 or more paid workers and positive output, worker 
compensation, and fixed assets; excluded industries are tobacco, publishing and printing, 
petroleum products, and recycling. 
Source: Author's compilations from firm-level data underlying General Statistics Office (2011, 
2013).
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Industry Private firms SOEs WFs JVs
 Manufacturing, 11 sample industries 7.75 17.79 7.80 16.98
  Food & beverages 8.46 14.89 15.44 19.54
  Textiles 4.84 9.76 3.42 7.35
  Apparel, leather, & footwear 3.49 4.63 2.60 2.57
  Wood products & furniture 4.40 12.55 3.13 8.39
  Paper 6.28 9.69 6.00 16.84
  Chemicals, rubber, & plastics 11.37 22.61 13.00 17.74
  Non-metallic mineral products 5.99 15.84 9.66 17.84
  Basic metals & metal products 10.39 21.07 8.46 26.33
  General machinery 16.98 35.05 14.68 15.52
  Electronic machinery 18.88 31.07 10.13 29.25
  Transportation machinery 11.37 23.24 7.53 17.19
Table 3: Shares of workers with higher education in firms reporting compensation by 
occupation, ownership, and industry (percentage per workers)
Note: Samples include firms with 20 or more paid workers and positive sales, worker 
compensation, and fixed assets; excluded industries are tobacco, publishing and printing, 
petroleum products, and recycling. 
Source: Author's compilations from firm-level data underlying General Statistics Office (2011, 
2013).
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Independent variable, 
indicator
KI 0.0110 0.0067 0.0017 -0.0098 c
RO 0.1357 a 0.1531 a 0.1221 a 0.1234 a
SH 0.0087 a 0.0087 a 0.0058 a 0.0059 a
SM -0.0018 a -0.0018 a -0.0008 c -0.0009 c
SF -0.0013 a -0.0013 a -0.0015 a -0.0015 a
DW 0.5435 a 0.5437 a 0.2786 a 0.2793 a
DJ 0.5731 a 0.5755 a 0.3087 a 0.3089 a
DS 0.0311 0.0343 0.0693 a 0.0687 a
Test DW=DJ 237.10 a 240.37 a 117.83 a 116.75 a
Observations 7,995 7,795 7,795 7,795
R2 0.341 0.341 0.277 0.277
#industry dummies 27 27 27 27
Independent variable, 
indicator
KI 0.0259 a -0.0081 0.0126 -0.0066
RO 0.1263 a 0.1181 a 0.0985 a 0.1060 a
SH 0.0080 a 0.0079 a 0.0056 a 0.0056 a
SM 0.0011 b 0.0011 a -0.0010 b -0.0009 b
SF -0.0039 a -0.0038 a -0.0010 a -0.0010 a
DW 0.1506 a 0.1421 a 0.2142 a 0.2103 a
DJ 0.1450 a 0.1358 a 0.2468 a 0.2439 a
DS 0.1015 a 0.0955 a 0.1027 a 0.1019 a
Test DW=DJ 47.90 a 42.95 a 61.31 a 59.47 a
Observations 7,795 7,795 7,795 7,795
R2 0.304 0.305 0.213 0.213
#industry dummies 27 27 27 27
Table 4: OLS Estimates of slope ownership-related wage differentials and other slope 
coefficients from estimates of equation (1); all p-values based on robust standard 
errors; 11 sample industries combined
Lagged Contem-poraneous Lagged
Contem-
poraneous
Lagged Contem-poraneous Lagged
Contem-
poraneous
Notes: a=signficant at the 1% level, b=significant at the 5% level, c=significant at the 
10% level; all estimates include 5 regional dummies and 53 industry dummies (see the 
text for definitions); theTestDFs rows show Wald tests of the hypothesis that 
coefficients on DW and DJ are equal and associated p-values; full results including the 
constant and all dummy coefficients are available from the authors.
Professionals & technicians
Production workers Clerical & support workers
Managers
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WF-private, 11 industries 0.5435 a 0.5437 a 0.2786 a 0.2793 a
  Food & beverages 0.6800 a 0.6858 a 0.2557 a 0.2515 a
  Textiles 0.6627 a 0.6566 a 0.3141 a 0.3135 a
  Apparel, leather, & footwear 0.4834 a 0.4845 a 0.2781 a 0.2795 a
  Wood products & furniture 0.5225 a 0.5279 a 0.1950 a 0.1936 a
  Paper 0.5225 a 0.5196 a 0.3515 a 0.3550 a
  Chemicals, rubber, & plastics 0.4771 a 0.4830 a 0.3088 a 0.2848 a
  Non-metallic mineral products 0.5355 a 0.5324 a 0.2798 a 0.2698 a
  Basic metals & metal products 0.6169 a 0.6135 a 0.3811 a 0.3781 a
  General machinery 0.5727 a 0.6259 a 0.2313 0.2430 c
  Electronic machinery 0.4667 a 0.4494 a 0.3344 a 0.3245 a
  Transportation machinery 0.4330 a 0.4314 a 0.2407 a 0.2416 a
JV-private, 11 industries 0.5731 a 0.5755 a 0.3087 a 0.3089 a
  Food & beverages 0.6238 a 0.6295 a 0.3128 a 0.3070 a
  Textiles 0.6584 a 0.6593 a 0.5760 a 0.5741 a
  Apparel, leather, & footwear 0.1312 0.1363 0.1806 0.1842
  Wood products & furniture 0.7208 a 0.7276 a 0.2314 b 0.2352 b
  Paper 0.0161 -0.0092 -0.4104 -0.4551
  Chemicals, rubber, & plastics 0.6064 a 0.6122 a 0.2624 a 0.2528 a
  Non-metallic mineral products 0.4291 a 0.4225 a 0.3694 a 0.3754 a
  Basic metals & metal products 0.4921 a 0.4935 a 0.3732 a 0.3707 a
  General machinery 0.4280 b 0.4155 b 0.3164 c 0.3014 c
  Electronic machinery 1.1888 a 1.1780 a 0.4337 a 0.4288 a
  Transportation machinery 0.6569 a 0.6562 a 0.4521 a 0.4604 a
Test WF-priv=JV-priv, 11 indus. 237.1 a 240.4 a 117.8 a 116.8 a
  Food & beverages 41.0 a 42.2 a 12.7 a 12.4 a
  Textiles 28.1 a 25.4 a 11.3 a 12.0 a
  Apparel, leather, & footwear 23.7 a 24.0 a 17.6 a 17.9 a
  Wood products & furniture 34.9 a 36.6 a 7.4 a 7.9 a
  Paper 7.0 a 6.7 a 5.7 a 4.3 a
  Chemicals, rubber, & plastics 30.8 a 31.1 a 17.0 a 16.0 a
  Non-metallic mineral products 11.7 a 11.6 10.4 a 10.2 a
  Basic metals & metal products 29.1 a 29.5 a 25.0 a 24.5 a
  General machinery 9.6 a 10.7 a 2.2 2.3
  Electronic machinery 19.4 a 18.7 a 7.6 a 7.5 a
  Transportation machinery 9.2 a 10.0 a 6.4 a 6.7 a
Table 5: Industry-level OLS estimates of ownership-related wage differentials from 
estimates of equation (1) for managers and professionals/technicians; all p-values based 
on robust standard errors
Professionals & 
technicians
Contem-
poraneous
Differential or indicator, industry
Managers
Lagged Lagged Contem-poraneous
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SOE-private, 11 industries 0.0311 0.0343 0.0693 a 0.0687 a
  Food & beverages 0.1875 a 0.1890 a 0.1896 a 0.1841 a
  Textiles 0.0727 0.0727 0.1004 0.0999
  Apparel, leather, & footwear 0.0148 0.0223 -0.0645 -0.0563
  Wood products & furniture 0.0323 0.0395 -0.2079 c -0.2090 c
  Paper 0.3140 c 0.3149 c 0.1164 0.1269
  Chemicals, rubber, & plastics 0.1296 0.1456 0.1722 b 0.1780 b
  Non-metallic mineral products -0.0201 -0.0207 0.0235 0.0312
  Basic metals & metal products -0.0891 -0.0874 0.1012 0.0986
  General machinery -0.0769 -0.0657 0.0871 0.0823
  Electronic machinery 0.0913 0.0855 0.2878 b 0.2867 b
  Transportation machinery -0.1967 b -0.1956 b -0.0563 -0.0517
Table 5 (continued)
Notes: a=signficant at the 1% level, b=significant at the 5% level, c=significant at the 
10% level; ; see Appendix Table 5  for other slope coefficients and indicators; full 
results including all coefficients and equation details are available from the authors.
Lagged Contem-
Differential or indicator, industry Managers
Lagged Contem-
Professionals & 
technicians
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WF-private, 11 industries 0.1506 a 0.1421 a 0.2142 a 0.2103 a
  Food & beverages 0.1539 a 0.1478 a 0.3102 a 0.3117 a
  Textiles 0.2470 a 0.2291 a 0.2198 a 0.2210 a
  Apparel, leather, & footwear 0.1325 a 0.1315 a 0.1338 b 0.1350 b
  Wood products & furniture 0.1232 a 0.0870 b 0.2019 a 0.1916 a
  Paper 0.0241 0.0153 0.1361 0.1081
  Chemicals, rubber, & plastics 0.1402 a 0.1400 a 0.2733 a 0.2698 a
  Non-metallic mineral products 0.1236 c 0.1175 c -0.0376 -0.0403
  Basic metals & metal products 0.2514 a 0.2333 a 0.2473 a 0.2375 a
  General machinery 0.3398 a 0.3511 a 0.3196 b 0.3591 a
  Electronic machinery 0.1778 b 0.1725 b 0.2812 a 0.2816 a
  Transportation machinery 0.0533 0.0416 0.2033 b 0.1921 c
JV-private, 11 industries 0.1450 a 0.1358 a 0.2468 a 0.2439 a
  Food & beverages 0.1481 b 0.1422 b 0.2155 b 0.2156 b
  Textiles 0.2778 c 0.2525 c 0.1638 0.1619
  Apparel, leather, & footwear 0.0754 0.0726 0.0130 0.0239
  Wood products & furniture 0.1127 0.0971 0.1553 0.1600
  Paper -1.5789 a -1.6830 a -0.6252 -0.7274
  Chemicals, rubber, & plastics 0.2170 a 0.2166 a 0.3098 a 0.3062 a
  Non-metallic mineral products 0.1529 b 0.1403 b 0.2453 a 0.2392 a
  Basic metals & metal products 0.1960 b 0.1802 c 0.3951 a 0.3896 a
  General machinery 0.2769 c 0.2607 c 0.0313 0.0192
  Electronic machinery 0.2171 0.2189 0.5022 a 0.5010 a
  Transportation machinery 0.0990 0.0841 0.4504 a 0.4276 a
Test WF-priv=JV-priv, 11 indus. 47.9 a 43.0 a 61.3 a 59.5 a
  Food & beverages 5.6 a 5.2 a 12.5 a 12.8 a
  Textiles 8.6 a 8.5 a 4.6 b 4.7 a
  Apparel, leather, & footwear 5.3 a 5.3 a 2.9 c 3.0 c
  Wood products & furniture 4.7 a 2.4 c 5.2 a 4.8 a
  Paper 15.5 a 9.7 a 2.0 1.5
  Chemicals, rubber, & plastics 8.4 a 8.2 a 16.7 a 16.6 a
  Non-metallic mineral products 3.6 b 3.2 b 4.1 b 3.8 b
  Basic metals & metal products 16.3 a 14.0 a 10.7 a 9.9 a
  General machinery 5.5 a 6.3 a 3.4 b 4.4 b
  Electronic machinery 2.9 c 2.8 c 9.8 a 10.0 a
  Transportation machinery 0.4 0.3 4.7 b 4.4 b
Contem-
poraneous
Clerical & support 
workers
Table 6: Industry-level OLS estimates of ownership-related wage differentials from 
estimates of equation (1) for production workers and clerical/support workers; all p-
values based on robust standard errors
Differential or indicator, industry
Production workers
Lagged Lagged Contem-poraneous
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SOE-private, 11 industries 0.1015 a 0.0955 a 0.1027 a 0.1019 a
  Food & beverages 0.1687 a 0.1672 a 0.2760 a 0.2729 a
  Textiles 0.0181 0.0098 0.0174 0.0168
  Apparel, leather, & footwear 0.1000 c 0.0938 c -0.0166 -0.0064
  Wood products & furniture -0.0611 -0.1056 -0.0996 -0.1109
  Paper 0.1222 0.1290 0.3586 a 0.3452 a
  Chemicals, rubber, & plastics 0.2017 a 0.2129 a 0.2991 a 0.3004 a
  Non-metallic mineral products 0.0284 0.0232 -0.0223 -0.0194
  Basic metals & metal products 0.0582 0.0415 0.0136 0.0078
  General machinery 0.1588 c 0.1531 0.1423 0.1489
  Electronic machinery 0.3464 a 0.3533 a 0.3954 a 0.3930 a
  Transportation machinery -0.0546 -0.0535 -0.0225 -0.0271
Notes: a=signficant at the 1% level, b=significant at the 5% level, c=significant at the 
10% level; ; see Appendix Table 6  for other slope coefficients and indicators; full results 
including all coefficients and equation details are available from the authors.
Lagged Contem-
Table 6 (continued)
Differential or indicator, industry Production workers
Lagged Contem-
Clerical & support 
workers
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Industry Private firms SOEs WFs JVs
 Manufacturing, 11 sample industries 237,944 85,990 248,369 85,990
  Food & beverages 75,591 15,716 53,331 15,716
  Textiles 7,880 2,963 13,859 2,963
  Apparel, leather, & footwear 15,866 4,122 40,786 4,122
  Wood products & furniture 17,564 1,677 14,008 1,677
  Paper 7,861 2,396 5,620 2,396
  Chemicals, rubber, & plastics 26,975 17,060 30,292 17,060
  Non-metallic mineral products 16,493 12,498 2,937 12,498
  Basic metals & metal products 40,807 10,504 15,336 10,504
  General machinery 4,056 1,228 4,501 1,228
  Electronic machinery 11,730 6,685 48,880 6,685
  Transportation machinery 13,121 11,143 18,818 11,143
 Excluded industries and firms 143,065 30,159 67,489 37,021
Appendix Table 1: Sales of sample firms reporting compensation by ownership, and industry
Note: Samples include firms with 20 or more paid workers and positive output, worker 
compensation, and fixed assets; excluded industries are tobacco, publishing and printing, 
petroleum products, and recycling. 
Source: Author's compilations from firm-level data underlying General Statistics Office (2011, 
2013).
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Industry Private firms SOEs WFs JVs
 Managers, 11 sample industries 41.16 43.05 84.94 92.16
  Food & beverages 31.84 44.05 115.78 111.29
  Textiles 27.76 40.01 86.54 61.63
  Apparel, leather, & footwear 112.19 29.82 69.49 46.14
  Wood products & furniture 28.05 32.93 80.64 73.97
  Paper 29.72 52.67 76.74 45.59
  Chemicals, rubber, & plastics 37.10 66.05 84.83 96.71
  Non-metallic mineral products 29.31 47.86 112.17 73.95
  Basic metals & metal products 30.86 37.33 82.79 89.21
  General machinery 32.29 30.65 72.18 50.25
  Electronic machinery 39.20 51.35 103.70 167.70
  Transportation machinery 29.99 32.63 86.03 127.23
Professionals & technicans,11 sample industries 18.63 24.91 33.12 34.76
  Food & beverages 20.16 27.06 31.75 36.55
  Textiles 16.94 21.36 29.98 24.93
  Apparel, leather, & footwear 18.35 17.04 33.28 25.21
  Wood products & furniture 16.93 15.41 29.86 33.68
  Paper 17.64 24.86 45.86 36.52
  Chemicals, rubber, & plastics 21.29 34.08 33.05 35.77
  Non-metallic mineral products 17.59 25.71 32.17 36.44
  Basic metals & metal products 18.23 24.30 32.43 26.25
  General machinery 20.60 23.11 28.81 37.19
  Electronic machinery 20.39 31.94 44.13 44.63
  Transportation machinery 18.32 21.33 28.10 34.03
Clerical & support workers, 11 sample industrie 13.90 18.54 21.68 23.42
  Food & beverages 13.25 19.57 23.38 22.04
  Textiles 12.24 14.22 18.46 14.96
  Apparel, leather, & footwear 17.41 13.17 19.71 18.88
  Wood products & furniture 12.06 13.39 23.62 16.84
  Paper 12.48 19.52 23.11 10.24
  Chemicals, rubber, & plastics 14.17 26.14 25.38 22.98
  Non-metallic mineral products 13.29 17.51 16.68 22.53
  Basic metals & metal products 15.14 16.61 20.37 31.23
  General machinery 14.64 17.79 21.21 14.73
  Electronic machinery 14.70 29.17 24.59 29.29
  Transportation machinery 12.99 15.99 17.72 30.60
 Excluded industries 13.60 23.85 18.60 17.01
Appendix Table 2: Mean compensation per paid worker, excluding employer contributions to 
social insurance, in firms reporting compensation by occupation, ownership, and industry
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Appendix Table 2 (continued)
Industry
Private 
firms SOEs WFs JVs
Production workers, 11 sample industries 13.88 19.09 16.90 20.53
  Food & beverages 13.59 19.21 19.77 21.89
  Textiles 11.22 13.21 14.36 17.07
  Apparel, leather, & footwear 11.52 12.53 14.39 13.72
  Wood products & furniture 14.30 11.59 14.21 15.89
  Paper 12.72 19.38 17.69 3.47
  Chemicals, rubber, & plastics 14.67 24.16 20.67 21.99
  Non-metallic mineral products 13.60 22.59 18.79 21.66
  Basic metals & metal products 14.88 18.36 17.55 24.17
  General machinery 16.22 19.78 19.55 19.79
  Electronic machinery 18.06 26.02 16.44 23.76
  Transportation machinery 17.87 17.73 15.95 23.00
Note: Samples include firms with 20 or more paid workers and positive sales, worker 
compensation, and fixed assets; excluded industries are tobacco, publishing and printing, 
petroleum products, and recycling. 
Source: Author's compilations from firm-level data underlying General Statistics Office (2011, 
2013).
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Industry Private firms SOEs WFs JVs
 Manufacturing, 11 sample industries 13.15 15.08 11.46 16.15
  Food & beverages 12.07 18.44 15.52 18.19
  Textiles 9.59 10.14 10.13 6.81
  Apparel, leather, & footwear 6.71 6.34 6.10 4.79
  Wood products & furniture 8.39 9.50 4.23 13.79
  Paper 11.60 9.88 10.55 27.78
  Chemicals, rubber, & plastics 15.76 15.02 14.41 18.68
  Non-metallic mineral products 11.67 12.01 15.94 21.89
  Basic metals & metal products 19.63 19.61 16.33 17.27
  General machinery 27.62 28.92 20.03 32.17
  Electronic machinery 25.67 17.49 13.25 18.69
  Transportation machinery 22.83 16.16 13.25 13.65
Appendix Table 3: Shares of workers with secondary education in firms reporting compensation 
by ownership, and industry (percentage per workers)
Source: Author's compilations from firm-level data underlying General Statistics Office (2011, 
2013).
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Industry Private firms SOEs WFs JVs
 Manufacturing, 11 sample industries 5,198 490 1,821 286
  Food & beverages 843 95 143 51
  Textiles 268 27 141 9
  Apparel, leather, & footwear 646 42 401 36
  Wood products & furniture 772 27 182 26
  Paper 293 14 56 2
  Chemicals, rubber, & plastics 559 53 323 41
  Non-metallic mineral products 714 73 45 29
  Basic metals & metal products 642 55 210 43
  General machinery 154 18 54 7
  Electronic machinery 130 29 139 20
  Transportation machinery 177 57 127 22
 Excluded industries and firms 5,813 204 1,145 86
Appendix Table 4: Number of sample firms reporting compensation by occupation, ownership, 
and industry
Note: Samples include firms with 20 or more paid workers and positive output, worker 
compensation, and fixed assets; excluded industries are tobacco, publishing and printing, 
petroleum products, and recycling. 
Source: Author's compilations from firm-level data underlying General Statistics Office (2011, 
2013).
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Variable, indicator
Value P-val. Value P-val. Value P-val. Value P-val.
Food and beverages
KI -0.0120 0.664 0.0169 0.391 0.0291 0.219 0.0059 0.698
RQ 0.2036 0.000 0.1907 0.000 0.1812 0.000 0.1630 0.000
SH 0.0100 0.000 0.0100 0.000 0.0071 0.000 0.0072 0.000
SM -0.0010 0.548 -0.0010 0.549 0.0000 0.997 0.0000 0.988
SF 0.0008 0.530 0.0008 0.558 0.0005 0.612 0.0005 0.590
DW 0.6800 0.000 0.6858 0.000 0.2557 0.000 0.2515 0.000
DJ 0.6238 0.000 0.6295 0.000 0.3128 0.000 0.3070 0.000
DS 0.1875 0.008 0.1890 0.007 0.1896 0.002 0.1841 0.002
Test DW=DJ 41.03 0.000 42.17 0.000 12.67 0.000 12.39 0.000
Obs./R2 1,132 0.404 1,132 0.403 1,132 0.3327 1,132 0.3318
No. DI s 3 3 3 3
Textiles
KI 0.0180 0.603 -0.0298 0.246 -0.0085 0.741 -0.0074 0.736
RQ 0.0871 0.122 0.1193 0.000 0.0714 0.055 0.0671 0.001
SH 0.0046 0.485 0.0040 0.540 0.0071 0.176 0.0071 0.171
SM -0.0058 0.046 -0.0064 0.022 -0.0051 0.021 -0.0050 0.018
SF 0.0003 0.858 0.0007 0.695 -0.0006 0.675 -0.0006 0.664
DW 0.6627 0.000 0.6566 0.000 0.3141 0.000 0.3135 0.000
DJ 0.6584 0.000 0.6593 0.000 0.5760 0.006 0.5741 0.005
DS 0.0727 0.599 0.0727 0.599 0.1004 0.339 0.0999 0.339
Test DW=DJ 28.13 0.000 25.42 0.000 11.28 0.000 12.02 0.000
Obs./R2 445 0.344 445 0.339 445 0.2686 445 0.2685
No. DI s 0 0 0 0
Apparel and leather products
KI -0.0164 0.544 -0.0068 0.719 -0.0543 0.014 -0.0300 0.042
RQ 0.1078 0.005 0.1263 0.000 0.0856 0.003 0.0958 0.000
SH -0.0015 0.760 -0.0014 0.777 0.0000 0.991 0.0001 0.978
SM -0.0060 0.082 -0.0060 0.081 -0.0063 0.007 -0.0062 0.007
SF -0.0036 0.088 -0.0037 0.086 -0.0039 0.016 -0.0039 0.016
DW 0.4834 0.000 0.4845 0.000 0.2781 0.000 0.2795 0.000
DJ 0.1312 0.467 0.1363 0.452 0.1806 0.118 0.1842 0.111
DS 0.0148 0.864 0.0223 0.796 -0.0645 0.382 -0.0563 0.441
Test DW=DJ 23.73 0.000 24.00 0.000 17.64 0.000 17.91 0.000
Obs./R2 1,125 0.213 1,125 0.212 1,125 0.1823 1,125 0.1814
No. DI s 1 1 1 1
Lagged Contem-poraneous Lagged
Contem-
poraneous
Appendix Table 5: OLS estimates of ownership-related wage differentials and other slope 
coefficients for managers and technicians/professionals; all p-values based on robust standard 
errors
Managers Professionals & technicians
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Variable, indicator
Value P-val. Value P-val. Value P-val. Value P-val.
Wood products and furniture
KI 0.0115 0.629 0.0065 0.694 0.0126 0.487 -0.0015 0.908
RQ 0.1321 0.000 0.1609 0.000 0.1216 0.000 0.1322 0.000
SH 0.0058 0.070 0.0058 0.065 0.0063 0.036 0.0063 0.037
SM -0.0017 0.431 -0.0017 0.444 -0.0031 0.123 -0.0031 0.128
SF -0.0050 0.000 -0.0049 0.000 -0.0034 0.000 -0.0033 0.000
DW 0.5225 0.000 0.5279 0.000 0.1950 0.001 0.1936 0.001
DJ 0.7208 0.000 0.7276 0.000 0.2314 0.043 0.2352 0.040
DS 0.0323 0.793 0.0395 0.745 -0.2079 0.084 -0.2090 0.081
Test DW=DJ 34.93 0.000 36.58 0.000 7.42 0.001 7.94 0.000
Obs./R2 1,007 0.414 1,007 0.414 1,007 0.342 1,007 0.3413
No. DI s 1 1 1 1
Paper products
KI 0.0415 0.543 0.0183 0.621 0.0344 0.495 -0.0064 0.841
RQ 0.1478 0.005 0.1608 0.000 0.0993 0.076 0.1485 0.000
SH 0.0056 0.180 0.0060 0.136 0.0024 0.408 0.0036 0.228
SM 0.0023 0.477 0.0026 0.425 0.0012 0.670 0.0019 0.496
SF 0.0013 0.477 0.0014 0.486 0.0018 0.301 0.0018 0.331
DW 0.5225 0.000 0.5196 0.000 0.3515 0.003 0.3550 0.004
DJ 0.0161 0.937 -0.0092 0.966 -0.4104 0.663 -0.4551 0.645
DS 0.3140 0.081 0.3149 0.081 0.1164 0.368 0.1269 0.336
Test DW=DJ 7.04 0.001 6.67 0.001 5.7 0.010 4.26 0.008
Obs./R2 365 0.310 365 0.309 365 0.2991 365 0.2886
No. DI s 0 0 0 0
Chemicals, rubber and plastics
KI 0.0200 0.564 0.0252 0.196 0.0427 0.092 0.0097 0.523
RQ 0.1009 0.025 0.1588 0.000 0.1195 0.000 0.1308 0.000
SH 0.0119 0.000 0.0119 0.000 0.0092 0.000 0.0089 0.000
SM -0.0017 0.342 -0.0017 0.347 -0.0004 0.723 -0.0008 0.497
SF 0.0007 0.585 0.0006 0.632 -0.0008 0.370 -0.0006 0.462
DW 0.4771 0.000 0.4830 0.000 0.3088 0.000 0.2848 0.000
DJ 0.6064 0.000 0.6122 0.000 0.2624 0.004 0.2528 0.005
DS 0.1296 0.219 0.1456 0.165 0.1722 0.036 0.1780 0.030
Test DW=DJ 30.82 0.000 31.11 0.000 16.99 0.000 15.97 0.000
Obs./R2 976 0.365 976 0.364 976 0.3239 976 0.3127
No. DI s 3 3 3 3
Lagged Contem-poraneous Lagged
Contem-
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Managers Professionals & technicians
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Variable, indicator
Value P-val. Value P-val. Value P-val. Value P-val.
Non-metallic mineral products
KI 0.0158 0.539 0.0003 0.986 0.0092 0.641 0.0008 0.953
RQ 0.1708 0.000 0.1743 0.000 0.1397 0.000 0.1366 0.000
SH 0.0089 0.012 0.0089 0.012 0.0029 0.283 0.0029 0.284
SM -0.0013 0.504 -0.0012 0.510 -0.0023 0.149 -0.0023 0.149
SF -0.0003 0.788 -0.0003 0.763 -0.0016 0.076 -0.0016 0.074
DW 0.5355 0.001 0.5324 0.001 0.2821 0.003 0.2798 0.003
DJ 0.4291 0.000 0.4225 0.001 0.3743 0.000 0.3694 0.000
DS -0.0201 0.806 -0.0207 0.798 0.0251 0.687 0.0235 0.704
Test DW=DJ 11.66 0.000 11.57 10.230 10.35 0.000 10.23 0.000
Obs./R2 861 0.371 861 0.370 861 0.324 861 0.3238
No. DI s 1 1 1 1
Basic metals and metal products
KI 0.0470 0.281 0.0327 0.105 0.0122 0.655 0.0035 0.825
RQ 0.1112 0.004 0.1280 0.000 0.1102 0.000 0.1063 0.000
SH 0.0110 0.000 0.0110 0.000 0.0053 0.000 0.0053 0.000
SM -0.0021 0.068 -0.0021 0.070 -0.0010 0.293 -0.0010 0.303
SF -0.0052 0.000 -0.0052 0.000 -0.0039 0.001 -0.0039 0.001
DW 0.6169 0.000 0.6135 0.000 0.3811 0.000 0.3781 0.000
DJ 0.4921 0.000 0.4935 0.000 0.3732 0.000 0.3707 0.000
DS -0.0891 0.378 -0.0874 0.367 0.1012 0.121 0.0986 0.125
Test DW=DJ 29.09 0.000 29.48 0.000 25.02 0.000 24.53 0.000
Obs./R2 950 0.325 950 0.325 950 0.2725 950 0.2723
No. DI s 3 3 3 3
General machinery
KI -0.0088 0.902 -0.0309 0.440 0.0173 0.809 -0.0441 0.257
RQ -0.0871 0.275 0.1281 0.000 0.0171 0.834 0.1073 0.001
SH 0.0069 0.012 0.0074 0.009 0.0020 0.503 0.0021 0.493
SM 0.0025 0.130 0.0027 0.103 0.0031 0.049 0.0033 0.034
SF -0.0039 0.111 -0.0047 0.060 -0.0031 0.206 -0.0035 0.143
DW 0.5727 0.000 0.6259 0.000 0.2313 0.110 0.2430 0.086
DJ 0.4280 0.026 0.4155 0.024 0.3164 0.092 0.3014 0.092
DS -0.0769 0.603 -0.0657 0.660 0.0871 0.565 0.0823 0.567
Test DW=DJ 9.62 0.000 10.73 0.000 2.17 0.101 2.32 0.101
Obs./R2 233 0.398 233 0.371 233 0.2123 233 0.2005
No. DI s 0 0 0 0
Lagged Contem-poraneous Lagged
Contem-
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Managers Professionals & technicians
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Variable, indicator
Value P-val. Value P-val. Value P-val. Value P-val.
Electronic machinery
KI 0.0951 0.525 0.0387 0.319 0.0208 0.698 -0.0091 0.767
RQ 0.1234 0.188 0.0987 0.002 0.0753 0.238 0.0765 0.000
SH 0.0079 0.008 0.0075 0.008 0.0082 0.001 0.0080 0.001
SM -0.0019 0.405 -0.0016 0.451 0.0007 0.737 0.0008 0.686
SF 0.0018 0.453 0.0019 0.424 0.0006 0.773 0.0007 0.731
DW 0.4667 0.000 0.4494 0.001 0.3344 0.001 0.3245 0.001
DJ 1.1888 0.000 1.1780 0.000 0.4337 0.009 0.4288 0.010
DS 0.0913 0.543 0.0855 0.572 0.2878 0.011 0.2867 0.012
Test DW=DJ 19.37 0.000 18.7 0.000 7.64 0.001 7.51 0.001
Obs./R2 318 0.316 349 0.314 318 0.2646 318 0.2637
No. DI s 4 4 4 4
Transportation machinery
KI 0.0322 0.429 0.0237 0.385 -0.0207 0.531 -0.0333 0.161
RQ 0.1420 0.003 0.1485 0.000 0.0737 0.063 0.1071 0.000
SH 0.0030 0.326 0.0031 0.310 0.0043 0.051 0.0044 0.033
SM -0.0035 0.032 -0.0035 0.031 0.0006 0.673 0.0005 0.719
SF 0.0019 0.444 0.0019 0.445 0.0013 0.483 0.0013 0.498
DW 0.4330 0.001 0.4314 0.001 0.2407 0.007 0.2416 0.007
DJ 0.6569 0.001 0.6562 0.001 0.4521 0.004 0.4604 0.003
DS -0.1967 0.043 -0.1956 0.044 -0.0563 0.449 -0.0517 0.486
Test DW=DJ 9.23 0.000 10.04 0.000 6.43 0.002 6.65 0.002
Obs./R2 383 0.411 383 0.401 383 0.2883 383 0.286
No. DI s 1 1 1 1
Note: in the Obs./R2 rows, the coefficient column contains the number of observations and the P-
value column contains the R-squared; all estimates include 5 regional dummies; see the text for 
definitions or region and industry dummies; the Test DFs rows show Wald tests of the hypothesis 
that coefficients on DW and DJ are equal and associated p-values; and full results including the 
constant and all dummy coefficients are available from the authors.
Lagged Contem-poraneous Lagged
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Managers Professionals & technicians
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Variable, indicator
Value P-val. Value P-val. Value P-val. Value P-val.
Food and beverages
KI 0.0484 0.071 0.0183 0.313 -0.0017 0.942 0.0037 0.821
RQ 0.1314 0.000 0.1447 0.000 0.1384 0.000 0.1133 0.000
SH 0.0118 0.000 0.0118 0.000 0.0074 0.000 0.0074 0.000
SM 0.0013 0.365 0.0013 0.369 -0.0023 0.123 -0.0023 0.120
SF -0.0022 0.027 -0.0021 0.031 -0.0005 0.659 -0.0005 0.645
DW 0.1539 0.002 0.1478 0.003 0.3102 0.000 0.3117 0.000
DJ 0.1481 0.036 0.1422 0.045 0.2155 0.012 0.2156 0.011
DS 0.1687 0.005 0.1672 0.006 0.2760 0.000 0.2729 0.000
Test DW=DJ 5.59 0.004 5.22 0.005 12.46 0.000 12.77 0.000
Obs./R2 1,132 0.364 1,132 0.363 1,132 0.233 1,132 0.234
No. DI s 3 3 3 3
Textiles
KI 0.0453 0.205 -0.0142 0.485 -0.0216 0.344 -0.0071 0.704
RQ 0.0986 0.026 0.0878 0.000 0.0834 0.051 0.0706 0.000
SH 0.0072 0.177 0.0060 0.243 0.0075 0.145 0.0076 0.135
SM 0.0025 0.139 0.0020 0.236 -0.0028 0.278 -0.0027 0.304
SF -0.0052 0.000 -0.0049 0.000 0.0028 0.070 0.0027 0.081
DW 0.2470 0.000 0.2291 0.000 0.2198 0.003 0.2210 0.003
DJ 0.2778 0.055 0.2525 0.072 0.1638 0.232 0.1619 0.235
DS 0.0181 0.826 0.0098 0.904 0.0174 0.892 0.0168 0.895
Test DW=DJ 8.57 0.000 8.46 0.002 4.61 0.010 4.73 0.009
Obs./R2 445 0.281 445 0.265 445 0.197 445 0.196
No. DI s 0 0 0 0
Apparel and leather products
KI 0.0121 0.527 -0.0061 0.639 0.0084 0.714 -0.0052 0.682
RQ 0.1037 0.000 0.0957 0.000 0.0483 0.061 0.0931 0.000
SH 0.0062 0.106 0.0061 0.109 0.0056 0.114 0.0057 0.105
SM -0.0025 0.141 -0.0025 0.139 -0.0036 0.105 -0.0037 0.097
SF -0.0025 0.031 -0.0025 0.031 -0.0018 0.167 -0.0019 0.144
DW 0.1325 0.001 0.1315 0.001 0.1338 0.016 0.1350 0.015
DJ 0.0754 0.253 0.0726 0.267 0.0130 0.932 0.0239 0.876
DS 0.1000 0.063 0.0938 0.072 -0.0166 0.797 -0.0064 0.919
Test DW=DJ 5.30 0.005 5.3 0.005 2.91 0.055 2.96 0.052
Obs./R2 1,125 0.264 1,125 0.263 1,125 0.154 1,125 0.152
No. DI s 1 1 1 1
Lagged Contem-poraneous Lagged
Contem-
poraneous
Appendix Table 6: OLS estimates of ownership-related wage differentials and other slope 
coefficients for production workers and clerical/support workers; all p-values based on robust 
standard errors
Production workers Clerical & support workers
78
Variable, indicator
Value P-val. Value P-val. Value P-val. Value P-val.
Wood products and furniture
KI 0.0533 0.054 0.0035 0.850 0.0651 0.002 0.0256 0.136
RQ 0.2341 0.000 0.1382 0.000 0.1089 0.000 0.1113 0.000
SH 0.0097 0.021 0.0093 0.031 0.0088 0.001 0.0086 0.001
SM 0.0007 0.723 0.0007 0.723 -0.0007 0.689 -0.0006 0.732
SF -0.0061 0.000 -0.0060 0.000 -0.0033 0.000 -0.0030 0.000
DW 0.1232 0.003 0.0870 0.037 0.2019 0.004 0.1916 0.006
DJ 0.1127 0.197 0.0971 0.309 0.1553 0.141 0.1600 0.125
DS -0.0611 0.379 -0.1056 0.130 -0.0996 0.442 -0.1109 0.387
Test DW=DJ 4.69 0.009 2.43 0.088 5.16 0.006 4.77 0.009
Obs./R2 1,007 0.299 1,007 0.283 1,007 0.236 1,007 0.233
No. DI s 1 1 1 1
Paper products
KI 0.1031 0.028 0.0082 0.775 0.0929 0.032 0.0000 1.000
RQ 0.0617 0.132 0.1245 0.000 0.1079 0.013 0.1102 0.000
SH -0.0004 0.943 0.0014 0.805 0.0041 0.104 0.0046 0.101
SM -0.0007 0.786 0.0004 0.870 -0.0028 0.194 -0.0022 0.312
SF 0.0018 0.310 0.0019 0.301 0.0031 0.132 0.0035 0.101
DW 0.0241 0.761 0.0153 0.854 0.1361 0.168 0.1081 0.282
DJ -1.5789 0.000 -1.6830 0.000 -0.6252 0.167 -0.7274 0.177
DS 0.1222 0.484 0.1290 0.476 0.3586 0.007 0.3452 0.010
Test DW=DJ 15.45 0.000 9.72 0.000 1.95 0.144 1.52 0.221
Obs./R2 365 0.289 365 0.255 365 0.318 365 0.303
No. DI s 0 0 0 0
Chemicals, rubber and plastics
KI 0.0155 0.572 0.0010 0.944 0.0109 0.679 -0.0050 0.737
RQ 0.0829 0.003 0.1318 0.000 0.1129 0.000 0.1249 0.000
SH 0.0076 0.000 0.0076 0.000 0.0059 0.002 0.0058 0.002
SM 0.0032 0.019 0.0032 0.020 0.0006 0.627 0.0006 0.648
SF -0.0011 0.212 -0.0012 0.188 0.0004 0.696 0.0004 0.702
DW 0.1402 0.002 0.1400 0.002 0.2733 0.000 0.2698 0.000
DJ 0.2170 0.000 0.2166 0.001 0.3098 0.000 0.3062 0.000
DS 0.2017 0.005 0.2129 0.003 0.2991 0.000 0.3004 0.000
Test DW=DJ 8.37 0.000 8.23 0.000 16.71 0.000 16.63 0.000
Obs./R2 976 0.340 976 0.324 976 0.258 976 0.257
No. DI s 3 3 3 3
Lagged Contem-poraneous Lagged
Contem-
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Production workers Clerical & support workers
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Variable, indicator
Value P-val. Value P-val. Value P-val. Value P-val.
Non-metallic mineral products
KI 0.0056 0.798 -0.0135 0.305 0.0171 0.388 -0.0064 0.637
RQ 0.1701 0.000 0.1570 0.000 0.1053 0.000 0.1260 0.000
SH 0.0084 0.000 0.0084 0.000 0.0037 0.171 0.0036 0.172
SM -0.0030 0.002 -0.0029 0.002 -0.0029 0.054 -0.0029 0.055
SF -0.0030 0.001 -0.0031 0.001 -0.0016 0.073 -0.0017 0.063
DW 0.1236 0.057 0.1175 0.070 -0.0376 0.685 -0.0403 0.666
DJ 0.1529 0.033 0.1403 0.045 0.2453 0.007 0.2392 0.009
DS 0.0284 0.643 0.0232 0.704 -0.0223 0.740 -0.0194 0.770
Test DW=DJ 3.57 0.029 3.18 0.042 4.08 0.017 3.84 0.022
Obs./R2 861 0.361 861 0.360 861 0.240 861 0.237
No. DI s 1 1 1 1
Basic metals and metal products
KI 0.0538 0.056 0.0042 0.809 0.0108 0.787 -0.0198 0.246
RQ 0.1249 0.000 0.0958 0.000 0.1157 0.001 0.1155 0.000
SH 0.0073 0.000 0.0071 0.000 0.0047 0.002 0.0046 0.002
SM -0.0003 0.748 -0.0001 0.872 -0.0014 0.139 -0.0013 0.154
SF -0.0050 0.000 -0.0050 0.000 -0.0031 0.019 -0.0031 0.019
DW 0.2514 0.000 0.2333 0.000 0.2473 0.001 0.2375 0.001
DJ 0.1960 0.050 0.1802 0.065 0.3951 0.001 0.3896 0.001
DS 0.0582 0.269 0.0415 0.427 0.0136 0.860 0.0078 0.918
Test DW=DJ 16.34 0.000 14 0.000 10.74 0.000 9.85 0.000
Obs./R2 950 0.239 950 0.232 950 0.197 950 0.195
No. DI s 3 3 3 3
General machinery
KI 0.0544 0.333 -0.0130 0.577 0.0132 0.834 -0.0164 0.605
RQ -0.0043 0.951 0.0888 0.000 -0.0845 0.298 0.0851 0.010
SH 0.0062 0.000 0.0062 0.000 0.0002 0.916 0.0006 0.782
SM 0.0022 0.172 0.0024 0.129 -0.0005 0.765 -0.0003 0.839
SF -0.0068 0.001 -0.0072 0.000 -0.0011 0.636 -0.0018 0.454
DW 0.3398 0.002 0.3511 0.001 0.3196 0.011 0.3591 0.004
DJ 0.2769 0.081 0.2607 0.093 0.0313 0.888 0.0192 0.932
DS 0.1588 0.093 0.1531 0.104 0.1423 0.342 0.1489 0.338
Test DW=DJ 5.52 0.005 6.32 0.002 3.37 0.036 4.44 0.013
Obs./R2 233 0.285 233 0.266 233 0.179 233 0.150
No. DI s 1 1 1 1
Lagged Contem-poraneous Lagged
Contem-
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Production workers Clerical & support workers
80
Variable, indicator
Value P-val. Value P-val. Value P-val. Value P-val.
Electronic machinery
KI -0.0014 0.978 -0.0092 0.713 -0.0469 0.495 -0.0485 0.110
RQ 0.0468 0.420 0.0985 0.000 0.1198 0.130 0.1029 0.000
SH 0.0043 0.089 0.0044 0.084 0.0078 0.002 0.0078 0.002
SM 0.0009 0.656 0.0008 0.679 0.0025 0.302 0.0025 0.290
SF -0.0075 0.000 -0.0074 0.000 0.0022 0.149 0.0021 0.156
DW 0.1778 0.024 0.1725 0.026 0.2812 0.002 0.2816 0.003
DJ 0.2171 0.113 0.2189 0.109 0.5022 0.000 0.5010 0.000
DS 0.3464 0.002 0.3533 0.001 0.3954 0.004 0.3930 0.004
Test DW=DJ 2.87 0.058 2.83 0.060 9.76 0.000 9.99 0.000
Obs./R2 318 0.301 318 0.299 318 0.267 318 0.267
No. DI s 4 4 4 4
Transportation machinery
KI -0.0448 0.199 -0.0838 0.000 0.0084 0.823 -0.0103 0.660
RQ 0.1014 0.026 0.1028 0.000 0.1183 0.017 0.0792 0.000
SH 0.0061 0.001 0.0063 0.000 0.0040 0.071 0.0040 0.082
SM 0.0035 0.006 0.0035 0.006 0.0011 0.439 0.0012 0.385
SF -0.0036 0.025 -0.0037 0.023 -0.0007 0.665 -0.0006 0.682
DW 0.0533 0.507 0.0416 0.608 0.2033 0.042 0.1921 0.051
DJ 0.0990 0.392 0.0841 0.462 0.4504 0.008 0.4276 0.010
DS -0.0546 0.411 -0.0535 0.416 -0.0225 0.838 -0.0271 0.804
Test DW=DJ 0.44 0.647 0.3 0.740 4.66 0.010 4.43 0.013
Obs./R2 383 0.278 383 0.273 383 0.201 383 0.198
No. DI s 1 1 1 1
Note: in the Obs./R2 rows, the coefficient column contains the number of observations and the P-
value column contains the R-squared; all estimates include 5 regional dummies; see the text for 
definitions or region and industry dummies; the Test DFs rows show Wald tests of the hypothesis 
that coefficients on DW and DJ are equal and associated p-values; and full results including the 
constant and all dummy coefficients are available from the authors.
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Production workers Clerical & support workers
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